identifying the obligation to find the plain and obvious meanings of words and also to construe those same words in pari materia
How later courts described this case
- identifying the obligation to find the plain and obvious meanings of words and also to construe those same words in pari materia
- “This court presumes that the legislature enacts statutes ‘with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are therefore to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence[.]’” (quoting Civic Ass’n of Wyo. v. Ry. Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213 , 116 P.2d 236, 245 (1941))
- “If we determine that the meaning is not subject to varying interpretations, that may end the exercise, although we may resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation, such as legislative history if available and rules of construction, to confirm the determination.”
- qu oting Ross v. Trustees of University of Wyoming, 31 Wyo. 464, 489, 228 P. 642, 651 (1924) and City of Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268, 270 (Wyo.1991)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CARDINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
I proceed from the premise that the Game and Fish Commission is liable for all damages (whether from disease, killing, clawing, injury or otherwise) to the livestock and property of citizens caused by big game, trophy game or other animals claimed, owned, protected by or licensed for hunting and taking by the Game and Fish. I would construe the pertinent statutes in pari materia to so provide.
Thus, if an owner can establish that elk, bison, or other big game or trophy game animals under the protection and authority of the Game and Fish Commission have transmitted disease which damaged (in this case it is alleged to have resulted in destruction of) a rancher’s cow herd, I cannot buy into a construction of our game and fish legislation that results in the Game and Fish ducking responsibility for damage it caused and the rancher going bankrupt. I do not believe the Game and Fish Commission is contending for that result. I am convinced that if there were clear proof that this rancher’s livestock herd was destroyed because of contamination by game animals, the Game and Fish would have been prepared to accept its responsibility and compensate the rancher accordingly.
With respect to legislative intent, that ought to be determined by conditions as they exist today in our society. Game and fish is big business. It generates large revenues from its game and fish operation. Much of the wild game feed off deeded lands owned by ranchers. The game goes to water in reservoirs and ponds constructed by ranchers and in creeks which often lie on ranchers’ deeded land. The Game and Fish Commission acknowledges its working partnership with the ranching community and generally accepts its responsibility when its operation causes damage to this segment of our community.
I cannot agree to the statutory construction developed by the majority. Due to the inconsistent placement of defined terms such as “trophy game animals” and “big game animals” within the subsections of W.S. 23-1-901, I would conclude that the statute is ambiguous concerning any intent to limit a claim based on the types of damages or the type of game animal. Then, because both wild bison and elk are directly controlled by the Game and Fish, I would hold that this general game damage *1080 statute was intended to apply when wild bison and elk damage private livestock. Therefore, in a claim in which the proof is clear, the facts favorable to the damaged rancher, and which establishes the cause of a rancher’s damage as contamination by game animals, I would allow recovery.
Were I deciding this case in the first instance, I might be inclined toward appellant. However, on appeal the question presented is one of substantial evidence to support the findings of the hearing officer and the decision of the commission. The Game and Fish Commission’s decision was based upon the conflicting testimony of the several expert witnesses. As stated by the court in its opinion, there was substantial evidence from the testimony of the experts most familiar with brucellosis and most familiar with wildlife brucellosis and this particular outbreak to support the finding that the source of the brucellosis had not been established by appellant by a preponderance of the evidence. In fact, the expert who investigated this outbreak could only conclude that the elk and bison were a potential, not a probable, source of the brucellosis. Therefore, I can agree that the Game and Fish Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s claim and will, with some reservation, concur.