stating that the purpose of punitive damages is furthered "'by punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious conduct [or conduct which manifests a knowing or reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of others] which is not likely to be deterred by other means'" (alteration in original)
How later courts described this case
- stating that the purpose of punitive damages is furthered "'by punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious conduct [or conduct which manifests a knowing or reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of others] which is not likely to be deterred by other means'" (alteration in original)
- reasoning that “[b]y reading the ‘no suit or action on this policy’ language as not covering tort, we are simply following the usual rule by which we narrowly construe a standard form contractual limitation provi sion that is not bargained for and is drafted by the insurance company”
- holding that where a party was not given the opportunity to file opposition to a motion for summary judgment, a "technical violation" of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure will "void the grant" of the motion unless "the violation amounts to harmless error"
- stating that "[ulnider our rule 59, it is well settled that, as a general matter, the trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial" before discussing "[t]llie precise nature of that discretion and what constitutes an abuse"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
(Concurring with Reservations):
I concur but write to express my reservation about some statements in the majority opinion as to when it is appropriate for the trial court to grant a new trial on the ground contained in Rule 59(a)(6), which is “[¡Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.” I prefer not to express any opinion as to the law governing the granting of a new trial when the motion to grant is premised on that ground. This is because Fire Insurance, in its motion for a new trial, in its argument to the trial court at the hearing on its motion, and in its brief and argument to this court, has relied only on Rule 59(a)(5), which allows a new trial to be granted when there has been “[ejxces-sive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.”
The majority opinion correctly states and applies the law governing this ground. We need not go further and attempt to restate the law governing other grounds for a new trial and examine, overrule, and criticize *814 our cases arising under those grounds, especially in brief footnotes.
I also refrain from expressing any opinion as to whether a motion for a new trial which challenges an award of “hard actual damages” is more appropriately brought under Rule 59(a)(6). In addition, I fail to see how an appellant could benefit by declining to move for a new trial but instead appealing directly an excessive damage award. In fact, there is an obvious disadvantage to that strategy. Therefore, I do not think we need assume that the trial court considered and denied a motion for a new trial sua sponte under Rule 59(d).