holding that “only a procedurally erroneous or substantively unreasonable sentence will be set aside” and that in approaching a sentencing proceeding the district court must first determine the properly calculated Guidelines range, give the parties an opportunity to present arguments regarding an appropriate sentence, and then consider the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a)
How later courts described this case
- holding that “only a procedurally erroneous or substantively unreasonable sentence will be set aside” and that in approaching a sentencing proceeding the district court must first determine the properly calculated Guidelines range, give the parties an opportunity to present arguments regarding an appropriate sentence, and then consider the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a)
- recognizing that “[w]hat constitutes a sufficient explanation will necessarily vary depending upon the complexity of the particular case, whether the sentence chosen is inside or outside the Guidelines, 3 and the strength and seriousness of the proffered reasons for imposing a sentence that differs from the Guidelines range”
- finding that the district court was not required to provide more than a simple explanation for imposing a sentence within the Guidelines even though the defendant requested a departure based on his lack of criminal history, available alternatives, and “his sons’ need for [] a role model”
- explaining that “[o]n appeal, we first consider whether the district court committed significant procedural error,” e.g., “fail[ure] to calculate—or to calculate incorrectly—the Guidelines range,” before “consider[ing] the substantive reasonableness of the sentence”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, with whom KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring in relevant part:
I join Judge Rymer’s opinion with the understanding that it affirms Carty’s within-Guidelines sentence by invoking a presumption that within-Guidelines sentences are “reasonable.” Despite the opinion’s quixotic claim that it “decline[s] to embrace a presumption [of reasonableness],” maj. op. at 994, it’s clear that this is precisely what the opinion does. After disposing of Carty’s procedural objections, see id. at 994-96, the opinion devotes few words to the reasonableness of his sentence; it affirms because “we see nothing unusual about Carty’s circumstances to compel a lower sentence.” Id. at 996.
When a sentence is within the Guidelines range, we know that “both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission ... have reached the same conclusion” that the sentence is “proper.” Rita v. United States, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2463 , 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). We must presume that such a sentence is reasonable, and we can rest on this presumption unless we are shown something “unusual” that “compels]” a different conclusion. Maj. op. at 996. Judge Rymer does this here, so I’m pleased to join.