finding unconstitutional Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3503.06, which *458stated that "[n]o person shall be entitled ... to sign or circulate any declaration of candidacy or any nominating, initiative, referendum, or recall petition, unless the person is registered as an elector and will have resided in the county and precinct where the person is registered for at least thirty days at the time of the next election," and citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3501.38(E)(1), which required that circulators "witness[ ] the affixing of every signature"
How later courts described this case
- finding unconstitutional Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3503.06, which *458stated that "[n]o person shall be entitled ... to sign or circulate any declaration of candidacy or any nominating, initiative, referendum, or recall petition, unless the person is registered as an elector and will have resided in the county and precinct where the person is registered for at least thirty days at the time of the next election," and citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3501.38(E)(1), which required that circulators "witness[ ] the affixing of every signature"
- holding that Ohio’s requirement that candidate-petition circulators must be Ohio residents and registered to vote in Ohio violated the First Amendment rights of independent presidential candidate
- holding that an Ohio law requiring candidate petition circulators to be registered to vote and residents of the state implicated and violated out-of-state circulators’ First Amendment rights
- finding Ohio’s ban on nonresident circulators of nomination petitions unconstitutional under strict scrutiny review
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I share Chief Judge Boggs’ views of most of the issues presented in this case, and write separately only to address a few passages in the lead opinion which I fear are likely to confuse future judges citing to Nader v. Blackwell as binding precedent.
First, the lead opinion states that “[t]his suit is a civil action for money damages against Blackwell in his personal capacity. It is not another chance for Nader to litigate the constitutionality of § 3503.06, the constitutionality of which is being challenged directly in other cases.” Lead Op. at 9. The lead opinion does nothing, however, to explain why the fact that Nader currently seeks only money damages somehow diminishes the implications of our holding that Ohio Revised Code § 3503.06 treads too far on constitutionally protected activity. As we correctly hold, “petition circulation activity constitutes core political speech, and any regulation of that speech is subject to exacting scrutiny.” Lead Op. at 13. The fact that we reach this holding in resolving a particular plaintiffs claim for money damages does not diminish its applicability to all future cases, and judges bound by the Sixth Circuit’s decisions must treat Nader v. Blackwell as they would any other published opinion of this Court.
Moreover, regardless of whether or not Nader has “directly” challenged the constitutionality of § 3503.06, Nader does raise a First Amendment challenge, and First Amendment challenges are governed by *479 the overbreadth doctrine. Under that doctrine, a First Amendment plaintiff “may prevail on a facial attack by demonstrating there is ‘a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.’ ” Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 135 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 , 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984)). Thus, upon our declaration that portions of § 3503.06 are unconstitutional as applied to Ralph Nader, any subsequent plaintiff who challenges the same provisions may prevail, even if the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to them. In other words, our decision that § 3503.06 is unconstitutional as applied to Ralph Nader has the same practical effect as a declaration that the portions of § 3503.06 which Nader challenges are facially unconstitutional, because any future litigant who raises a First Amendment challenge to the provisions challenged by Nader may prevail by noting that § 3503.06 “significantly compromise^]” the recognized First Amendment rights of Ralph Nader. Id. Nothing in this Court’s holding should be understood to abrogate the overbreadth doctrine.
I join Chief Judge Boggs’ opinion only insofar as it does not conflict with the views expressed in this concurring opinion and Judge Moore’s concurring opinion. I also join Judge Moore’s opinion.