holding that use of "substantial" to modify mitigating factor concerning "domination of another person" did not constitutionally circumscribe jury's evaluation of that mitigating factor
How later courts described this case
- holding that use of "substantial" to modify mitigating factor concerning "domination of another person" did not constitutionally circumscribe jury's evaluation of that mitigating factor
- permitting defendant to discuss or argue in allocution facts respecting guilt
- using same analysis on substantial domination of another person mitigating factor
- “We decline to formulate a rule of admissibility premised on the extent to which a witness may or may not be known to the general public.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by People v. McKinnon, 52 Cal. 4th 610 (2011)
53 Cal.3d 618, 660 , overruled on other grounds in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 637-638
Disapproved on other grounds by People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390 (2009)
53 Cal.3d 618, 700 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390
The opinion
BROUSSARD, J.,
Concurring.—I concur in the judgment, but write separately to express my concern on one point involving the motion for new trial and defendant’s unsubstantiated claim that there was serious juror misconduct.
The sequence of events following the entry of the judgment up until the hearing on the motion for new trial is rather disturbing. There is some suggestion that the prosecutor, using the media, may have caused some jurors to become reluctant to speak to defense investigators about the possibility of jury misconduct. While I agree with the majority opinion that the record contains insufficient evidence regarding the publicity to determine that the prosecutor’s conduct caused the jurors to refuse to speak to the defense investigators, and note that the trial court made every accommodation to defendant to encourage jurors to respond to defendant’s questions, I would condemn any use of the press for the purpose of discouraging juror contact with the defense team as flagrant misconduct. I cannot agree with the majority that the prosecutor’s “posttrial activities are generally not subject to any constitutional restraint.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 700.) Obviously the prosecutor cannot act in such a way as to impair a defendant’s right to a fair hearing at a motion for new trial, at imposition of sentence, or on appeal. In the case of such misconduct, the failure of the defendant to present a proper affidavit to support the motion for new trial would have to be excused.