reversing a conviction of conspiracy where “[t]he very same evidence which the jury apparently did not believe was sufficient to prove the defendant participated in the robbery was the only evidence which could prove him guilty of conspiracy” (emphasis in original)
How later courts described this case
- reversing a conviction of conspiracy where “[t]he very same evidence which the jury apparently did not believe was sufficient to prove the defendant participated in the robbery was the only evidence which could prove him guilty of conspiracy” (emphasis in original)
- because jury which returned a guilty verdict on conspiracy to commit robbery charge rejected the only evidence presented which could have supported such a charge when it acquitted the defendant of robbery, the verdicts were inconsistent and could not stand
- verdicts inconsistent where the very same evidence which the jury did not believe was sufficient to prove the defendant participated in robbery was the only evidence which could prove him guilty of conspiracy
- same facts and holding as Robles
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Frye, 17 Brief Times Rptr. 1696 (1993)
Declaring that Robles was inapplicable, the court concluded that United States v. Powell, supra, was the applicable standard and affirmed the judgment of conviction on an inconsistent guilty verdict.
Distinguished by Bates v. People, 179 Colo. 81 (1972)
We have said that the Robles decision is inapplicable in such circumstances because there is no inconsistency in the verdicts .when additional evidence is offered to establish the conspiracy.
The opinion
Mr. Justice McWilliams
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In the first place in my view the matter of so-called “inconsistent verdicts” is a matter which was not really urged by the plaintiff in error in this court. Indeed, in his summary of argument, plaintiff in error makes no mention, as such, of this particular matter. I am most reluctant to resolve a writ of error on a point that has not been fully explored by the parties themselves.
Secondly, I am by no means convinced that the verdicts returned by the jury are in fact inconsistent, i.e., the verdict of not guilty as to aggravated robbery, and a verdict of guilty as to conspiracy. To illustrate my thinking in this regard, the jury under the evidence might well have determined that Robles at the time and place of the robbery did not possess the “intent, if resisted, to kill, maim or wound the person robbed,” which is an essential ingredient of aggravated robbery, and at the same time the jury in my view could have very consistently believed that Robles was nonetheless guilty of the crime of conspiracy. This is particularly so inasmuch as the evidence is that the victim did “resist” by *302 firing at Robles and there is no evidence that Robles fired back, thereby tending to negate any intent to kill, maim or wound when resisted.
Thirdly, and more importantly, even if the verdicts be deemed inconsistent, such determination does not mean that the guilty verdict as to the conspiracy charge must be set aside and not permitted to stand. See Crane v. People, 91 Colo. 21 , 11 P.2d 567 and Starr v. People, 113 Colo. 268 , 157 P.2d 135 . And in each of these cases it should be observed that it was the “same evidence” which was offered in support of the conspiracy charge and in support of the charge of obtaining money under false pretenses in the Crane case, and the charge of embezzlement in the Starr case. I deem the majority opinion in the instant case to be at odds with both the Crane and Starr cases.