holding that where there is evidence of intent and a first-degree murder instruction is given, a heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction is also required if evidence exists to support a conviction under Oklahoma's manslaughter statute
How later courts described this case
- holding that where there is evidence of intent and a first-degree murder instruction is given, a heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction is also required if evidence exists to support a conviction under Oklahoma's manslaughter statute
- rejecting the state’s theory that a first degree heat of passion manslaughter “instruction is improper wherever there is evidence of intent.” The court continued: “under that theory a heat-of-passion instruction would never be appropriate where there was evidence of malice murder. The question is whether, in addition to evidence of intent, there was evidence that [defendant] killed [the victim] with adequate provocation, in a heat of passion, without the design to effect death.”
- finding no cumulative error sufficient to reverse Mr. Le’s conviction and sentence based on the errors of the “super aggravator” argument and the misstatement suggesting Mr. Le formed the intent to kill the Nguyens before leaving Ohio
- rejecting the notion that torture or serious physical abuse needs further definition
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LUMPKIN, Judge,
concurring in part/dissenting in part.
I concur in the decision to affirm the Judgments and Sentences for first degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon and assault and battery with intent to kill. However, I dissent to the dismissal of the larceny of a motor vehicle and grand larceny convictions. Prosecution and conviction of these last two offenses were not barred by double jeopardy as each was a separate and distinct offense.
Further, Section 11 is not to be used as a shield to allow a defendant the opportunity to commit any number of separate, distinguishable crimes without impunity merely because he may have had a specific ultimate objective in mind. Where a defendant commits offense after offense, he is properly subject to punishment for each offense. I do not find the Legislature has prohibited separate punishments for these offenses under the facts of the case. See Hale v. State, 888 P.2d 1027, 1033 (Okl.Cr.1995) (Lumpkin, J., Concur in Results). Using the Court’s analysis to its illogical conclusion would mean that since Appellant’s objective from the beginning was to steal the money in the safe deposit box, then all crimes committed as a “means to another ultimate objective” could only be punished through the sentencing on that ultimate objective crime. That would mean only the theft of the money from the safe deposit box could be punished in this case. Needless to say, that result would be patently absurd.
Finally, in addressing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the opinion relies on Strickland v. Washington. That case has since been clarified in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 , 113 S.Ct. 838, 842-43 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180, 189 (1993) wherein the Supreme Court stated:
*559 [A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective. To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s error may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him. See [United States v.] Cronic, 466 U.S. [648], at 658, 104 S.Ct. [2039], at 2046 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) ].
Therefore, the “ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 , 104 S.Ct. at 2069 , and not merely the outcome of the proceedings.