interpreting statutory language excusing from criminal responsibility mentally ill defendants when “at the time of committing the act charged against them they were incapable of knowing its wrongfulness,” Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 152(4) (West 2001), to mean the two-part M’Naghten test
How later courts described this case
- interpreting statutory language excusing from criminal responsibility mentally ill defendants when “at the time of committing the act charged against them they were incapable of knowing its wrongfulness,” Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 152(4) (West 2001), to mean the two-part M’Naghten test
- interpreting statutory language excusing from criminal respon sibility mentally ill defendants when “at the time of committing the act charged against them they were incapable of knowing its wrongful ness,” Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §152(4) (West 2001
- evidence of pregnancy irrelevant during guilt phase of capital trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CORNISH, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with Judge Bussey’s opinion insofar as it affirms the judgment of guilt reached by the jury at the end of the first stage proceeding. However, I am not unmindful of the responsibility given to the members of this Court by the Legislature, in addition to reviewing legal errors, to consider the propriety of the sentence imposed under 21 O.S.Supp.1980, § 701.13 C:
C. With regard to the sentence, the court [The Court of Criminal Appeals] shall determine:
1. Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
2. Whether the evidence supports the jury’s or judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in this act; and
3. Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. [Emphasis supplied.]
In a capital case the appellant is entitled to have the validity of his conviction appraised on considerations of the case as it was tried and as the issues were determined in the trial court. That fundamental principle of procedural fairness applies with no less force to the penalty phase of a trial in a capital case than it does in the guilt-determining phase. Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 442 U.S. 1301 , 99 S.Ct. 2091 , 60 L.Ed.2d 649 (1979), citing Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 , 99 S.Ct. 235 , 58 L.Ed.2d 207 (1978). Accordingly, it is this Court’s duty, where the evidence supports at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, to weigh that against the mitigating factors instructed by the court, as well as against any additional factors made known to the jury at trial. Merely to find that capital punishment was factually supported or justified by the evidence does not rise to the separate and independent judgment required of the reviewing court in death penalty cases. It is incumbent upon this Court to ensure that *553 the death penalty is evenly enforced and not inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 429 , 100 S.Ct. 1759 , 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980).
Furthermore, I interpret Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, to mandate the death penalty be reserved only for the most aggravating of circumstances, circumstances that are so shocking or repugnant that the murder stands out above the norm of first degree murders.
This writer concedes that the statutory aggravating circumstance, “the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” is constitutional and is supported by the evidence. However, I do not find persuasive the conclusion reached by the jury and the majority opinion which states that the evidence supports the second aggravating circumstance, i.e., “the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person,” the young child held in Mr. Burrows’ arm as he fatally shot his wife.
The following mitigating circumstances were brought out through the appellant’s testimony, testimony of other witnesses, instructions by the court, and argument of his counsel:
1. Mr. Burrows was thirty-one (31) years old at the time of the homicide and had no prior history of criminal activity.
2. He had been honorably discharged from the Air Force as a sergeant, after having served four and one-half (4½) years in Okinawa and the Phillipines. After marrying Mrs. Burrows, he received an accounting degree from East Central State College, in Ada, Oklahoma. He earned this degree in two and one-half (2½) years while working his way through school at a grocery store owned by his in-laws. The appellant was employed for four (4) years as an agent and auditor for the Internal Revenue Service, and during this employment, pursued a Masters degree in the Business Administration curriculum at Central State University. At the time of the homicide, he was within three (3) hours of completing his Masters degree.
3. The marriage between the appellant and the victim covered many years of domestic turmoil and strife, including repeated nagging by the victim due to the appellant’s chronic drinking problem.
4. It appears from the record that the appellant had consumed a large quantity of vodka and beer the afternoon and evening preceding the homicide.
These factors do not remove the criminality of the appellant’s acts. But it is of vital importance that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than on caprice or emotion. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 , 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977).
In my opinion, the mitigating circumstances shown at trial outweigh the aggravating circumstances, considering both the crime committed and the character and background of this particular appellant.
For the above and foregoing reasons, I would remand the case to the district court for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment.