holding statute which allowed public inspection of bar association records of complaints about attorney conduct did not substantially impair the inherent power of the judicial branch to regulate the bar
How later courts described this case
- holding statute which allowed public inspection of bar association records of complaints about attorney conduct did not substantially impair the inherent power of the judicial branch to regulate the bar
- involving the “information submitted to a public agency in confidence” exemption from disclosure now in ORS 192.502(3)
- communications to Oregon State Bar were not exempt from disclosure, despite potential harm to the public interest, where there was no evidence that any individuals who submitted complaints about an attorney did so on the condition, or with the understanding, that the complaints would be kept confidential
- involving the “information submitted to a public agency in confidence” exemption from disclosure now in ORS *439 192.502(3)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State Ex Rel. Frohnmayer v. Oregon State Bar, 307 Or. 304 (1989)
The narrow issue presented here is whether Sadler is distinguishable because the case at bar involves a disclosure request by an accused attorney in a pending disciplinary proceeding.
The opinion
TONGUE, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join in the views expressed by Howell, J., in his concurring opinion. We may believe that this statute, as enacted by the 1975 Oregon Legislature, is unfair and unjust as applied to complaints against lawyers, but we cannot properly deny the power of the legisla *296 ture to enact such a statute for the reasons stated by the majority.
I dissent, however, from the opinion by the majority insofar as it appears to apply the provisions of ORS 192.410 et seq. retroactively, so as to permit public access to complaints made against lawyers prior to the effective date of that statute on July 1, 1973.
In Joseph v. Lowery, 261 Or 545, 547 , 495 P2d 273 (1972), we approved the rule as stated in our previous decision in Kempf v. Carpenters & Joiners Union, 229 Or 337, 343 , 367 P2d 436 (1961), as follows:
" '* * * Unless retroactive construction is mandatory by the terms of the act it should not be applied if such construction will impair existing rights, create new obligations or impose additional duties with respect to past transactions * * ”
We also said (at 548-49):
"* * * [T]his court has refused to give retroactive application to the provisions of statutes which affect the legal rights and obligations arising out of past actions. This is without respect to whether the change might be 'procedural or remedial’ or 'substantive’ in a strictly technical sense. * * *”
It is true that there are differences between the statutes involved in this case and in Joseph . In my view, however, the reasons for the rule as stated in Joseph are also applicable in this case.