noting the "substantial identity of definitions appearing in Penal Code sections 370 and 371, and Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480," and going on to restate Cal.Penal Code section 370 as broadly defining a public nuisance as "[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or neighborhood, or by any considerable number of persons ..."
How later courts described this case
- noting the "substantial identity of definitions appearing in Penal Code sections 370 and 371, and Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480," and going on to restate Cal.Penal Code section 370 as broadly defining a public nuisance as "[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or neighborhood, or by any considerable number of persons ..."
- padlock order would constitute unconstitutional prior restraint
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLARK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the judgment and the opinion of the court except insofar as the new opinion differs from the vacated opinion by substitution of the material at page 58, line 4 to page 59, fine 34 in place of the following paragraph: “We express no opinion upon the further question whether the court may, in addition, either close the premises entirely or enjoin further ‘obscene’ exhibitions regarding materials not yet adjudged obscene. Several cases suggest that such further forms of relief would be appropriate and constitutionally permissible. (See People ex rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gals (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 556, 562-563 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 24 ]; Bloss v. Paris Township (1968) 380 Mich. 466 [ 157 N.W.2d 260 ]; Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask (N.D.Ohio 1970) 326 F.Supp. 574, 578-580 ; Oregon Bookmark Corporation v. Schrunk (D.Ore. 1970) 321 F.Supp. 639 ; State ex rel. Cabalan v. Diversified Theat. (1975) 59 Mich.App. 223 [ 229 N.W.2d 389, 396-397 ]; United Theaters of Fla., Inc. v. State ex rel. Gerstein (Fla.App. 1972) 259 So.2d 210, 212-213 , vacated and remanded, 419 U.S. 1028 [ 42 L.Ed.2d 304 , 95 S.Ct. 510 ].) Other cases have held that such relief would constitute an invalid prior restraint of presumptively protected materials (Gulf States Theatres of La., Inc. v. Richardson (La. 1973) 287 So.2d 480, 489 ; Mitchem v. State ex rel. Schaub (Fla. 1971) 250 So.2d 883, 886-887 ; *63 New Riviera Arts Theatre v. State (1967) 219 Tenn. 652 [ 412 S.W.2d 890, 893-895 ]; Sanders v. State (1974) 231 Ga. 608 [ 203 S.E.2d 153, 156-157 ]; State ex rel. Little Beaver Theatre, Inc. v. Tobin (Fla.App. 1972) 258 So.2d 30, 32 ; State ex rel. Ewing v. “Without A Stitch” (1974) 37 Ohio St.2d 95 [66 Ohio Ops.2d 223, 307 N.E.2d 911, 917-918 ].) Since the United States Supreme Court has not yet spoken on this difficult question, and since in this posture of the case the issue is not before us, we leave the question open for further consideration.”
McComb, J., concurred.