explaining that courts “have recognized a mentally ill person’s noncompliance with psychiatric medications can be, and usually is, the result of the mental impairment itself and, therefore, neither willful nor without a justifiable excuse”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that courts “have recognized a mentally ill person’s noncompliance with psychiatric medications can be, and usually is, the result of the mental impairment itself and, therefore, neither willful nor without a justifiable excuse”
- finding that because there was no “evidence . . . indicat[ing] [claimant’s] noncompliance at any time was a result of something other than her mental illness,” the claimant had “good reason” for her failure to comply with her medication
- holding that the ALJ may not substitute his own opinions for those of the physician
- holding that the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, in part due to the ALJ’s failure to discuss or consider numerous GAF scores below 50
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that remand for an immediate award of benefits is the appropriate remedy in this case. At step four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ decided that Pate-Fires retained the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work. Ante at 942. The majority finds that the ALJ reached this step-four conclusion in error. Specifically, the ALJ relied on an improper basis to reject Dr. Erby’s opinion, and substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s conclusion that Pate-Fires’s medical noncompliance precluded a finding of disability. Id. at 943, 947. To the extent the majority’s decision *948 to reverse the judgment of the district court is based on these errors in the ALJ’s step-four analysis, I concur.
However, remand for an immediate award of benefits is not an appropriate remedy for errors at step four of the sequential evaluation. Because substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s step-four conclusion that Pate-Fires had the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work, the ALJ must proceed to step five before he can ultimately decide whether Pate-Fires is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (g) (“If we find that you cannot do your past relevant work because you have a severe impairment(s) ... we will consider the same residual functional capacity assessment ... together with your vocational factors ... to determine if you can make an adjustment to other work.... If you can make an adjustment to other work, we will find you not disabled. If you cannot, we will find you disabled.”). The ALJ erroneously resolved Pate-Fires’s claim at step four, and he never considered whether she could make an adjustment to other work. (See Admin. R. at 24-25.) Therefore, I would remand for further proceedings so that the ALJ can move on to step five of the sequential evaluation.
The majority believes an immediate award of benefits is appropriate because “the medical evidence uniformly indicates Pate-Fires suffers from a severe mental impairment and cannot be expected to engage in any gainful employment.” Ante at 947. At step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ agreed that Pate-Fires’s “schizoaffective disorder, chronic substance abuse, and lumbar degenerative disc disease” were “severe” impairments. (Admin. R. at 16); accord, ante at 941-42. However, severity alone is not enough to warrant a finding of disability; severe impairments must also “meet[] or equalf] one of [the] listings in appendix 1 ... and meet[ ] the duration requirement.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4)(iii); see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(A) (“The listings are so constructed that an individual with an impairment(s) that meets or is equivalent in severity to the criteria of a listing could not reasonably be expected to do any gainful activity.”). At step three, the ALJ found that Pate-Fires’s “medically determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments.” (Admin. R. at 24); accord ante at 942.
If the majority believes that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s step-three conclusion, they should identify which listed impairment(s) Pate-Fires’s condition meets or equals. See 20 C.F.R. § 1520 (a)(4)(iii) (only “[i]f you have an impairments) that meets or equals one of our listings ... will [we] find that you are disabled”); see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(A) (“We will find that you have a listed impairment if the diagnostic description in the introductory paragraph [of the listed impairment] and the criteria of both paragraphs A and B (or A and C, when appropriate) of the listed impairment are satisfied.”). Disorders of the spine are listed in section 1.04. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.04. Mental disorders are divided into nine diagnostic categories and listed in sections 12.01 through 12.10, including “schizophrenic, paranoid and other psychotic disorders (12.03)” and “substance addiction disorders (12.09).” Id. § 12.00(A). Although the majority cites section 12.00(E), which is entitled “Chronic mental impairments,” section 12.00(E) is not actually a listed impairment; it is merely a preliminary instructional paragraph warning that, in evaluating cases where claimants have structured their lives “in such a way as to minimize [their] stress and reduce [their] symptoms ... *949 [t]he results of a single examination may not adequately describe [their] sustained ability to function.” Id. § 12.00(E).
Further, if the majority believes the ALJ erred at step three, then there is no need for their extensive discussion of errors the ALJ made in assessing Pate-Fires’s residual functional capacity, ante at 942-47, which is only relevant at steps four and five, See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 , 107 S.Ct. 2287 , 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (“If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (e) (“If your impairments) does not meet or equal a listed impairment, [then] we will assess and make a finding about your residual functional capacity....”). Thus, to the extent the majority believes that the ALJ erred at step three of the sequential evaluation process and, based on that belief, remands for an immediate award of benefits, I respectfully disagree.