noting that we consider our decisions "as highly persuasive and binding, unless we are convinced that the prior decisions are based upon clearly erroneous principles"
How later courts described this case
- noting that we consider our decisions "as highly persuasive and binding, unless we are convinced that the prior decisions are based upon clearly erroneous principles"
- we only overrule precedent “for compelling reasons . . . something more than 3 STATE v. HUDSON Decision of the Court that a prior case was wrongly decided” (cleaned up)
- Previous decisions of this court are considered highly persuasive and binding, unless we are convinced that the prior decision is based on clearly erroneous principles.
- we should consider a prior court of appeals decision binding unless it is “based upon clearly erroneous principles, or conditions have changed so as to render these prior decisions inapplicable.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
EUBANK, Judge
(specially concurring).
I was one of the concurring judges in the Terrell v. Industrial Commission, supra, opinion. Since I concur in this opinion, it is necessary that I state my reasons.
First, I found the Terrell approach very attractive since it solves the jurisdictional problem raised by matters on review by establishing a clear line of demarcation between the jurisdiction of the Commission and the Court of Appeals. Second, I found the opinion helpful in pointing out that the problem arises from legislative obtuseness and should be solved by legislative action rather than by judicial action. However, after reading Judge Haire’s fine analysis of the problem, I am convinced that he is correct and that, much as it is to be desired, there is no simple answer to this jurisdictional problem. Each case must be measured on the scale described above.
It is hoped that our Supreme Court will consider this question and once and for all put it to rest.