employee’s extreme conscientiousness over work and sensitivity to criticism by superiors produced job-related stress which in turn caused compensable cardiac arrhythmia
How later courts described this case
- employee’s extreme conscientiousness over work and sensitivity to criticism by superiors produced job-related stress which in turn caused compensable cardiac arrhythmia
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BURKE, J.
I dissent, for a review of the record in this case establishes *284 beyond reasonable dispute that substantial evidence supported the board’s finding that Lamb did not sustain an industrial injury.
The majority (p. 282) assert that the board failed to consider “the uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence” that Lamb’s employment resulted in “considerable emotional stress” to him. To the contrary, a review of the record discloses evidence in the form of medical reports and testimony to the effect that Lamb suffered no emotional stress whatever. This evidence, which I summarize below, clearly constituted substantial evidence in support of the board’s decision.
1. Dr. Winsor—Dr. Winsor reviewed Lamb’s medical records and the reports of other doctors, which reports and records outlined the pertinent facts regarding Lamb’s job and prior medical history. Both in his pretrial report and hearing testimony, Dr. Winsor insisted that no relationship existed between Lamb’s employment and his heart condition. Counsel devised a hypothetical question which incorporated all the relevant testimony regarding Lamb’s job (including its precision nature, the overtime required, Lamb’s dislike for the job, and his “conscientious” attitude) and which inquired whether this employment was stressful, either physically or emotionally. Winsor responded that “I think this [employment] would not be stressful either physically or emotionally.” With specific reference to Lamb’s work, Winsor testified that he could not imagine an “easier" job, and that from a health standpoint, Lamb’s work was neither “psychically” nor “physically” stressful.
2. Dr. Markovitz—Dr. Markovitz’ report reviewed the facts surrounding Lamb’s employment, medical history and subsequent death and concluded that death “was not caused, aggravated or accelerated by any work activities that he did at his place of employment.” At the hearing, Markovitz testified that he did not consider Lamb’s work to be “emotionally stressful.” Counsel incorporated the essential facts surrounding Lamb’s case into a hypothetical question, and then asked Markovitz “Was there anything in the history or medical reports, other information, that was incorporated in my hypothetical question that would lead you to believe that his [Lamb’s] underlying diseases . . . were in any way aggravated or accelerated by his—the emotional phase of his job?” Markovitz responded, “No.” He agreed that stress, emotional or physical, could be a factor contributing to heart disease, but he testified unambiguously that Lamb’s employment situation was not stressful to him.
Given the foregoing evidence, I fail to understand how the majority are able to characterize petitioner’s own evidence of emotional stress as *285 “undisputed,” “uncontradicted” and “unimpeached.” Possibly, the majority believe that petitioner’s evidence was more credible than the testimony of Drs. Winsor and Markovitz which, as noted above, was based in part on their responses to hypothetical questions. Yet the weight to be given to the evidence is a matter for the board to determine, not this court.
As this court held in Nielsen v. Industrial Acc. Com., 220 Cal. 118, 122-123 [ 29 P.2d 852 ], despite a lack of personal knowledge on their part, “The opinion of experts based on hypothetical statements of the facts in the record is competent evidence. The weight of such evidence is for the commission’s determination.” (Accord: Foremost Dairies v. Industrial Acc. Com., 237 Cal.App.2d 560, 569-570 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 173 ]; Le Strange v. City of Berkeley, 233 Cal.App.2d 276, 277-278 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 455 ]; Foster v. Industrial Acc. Com., 136 Cal.App.2d 812, 815 [ 289 P.2d 253 ].) These cases each expressly dispute the premise that the board must accept at face value the testimony of witnesses who purport to have personal knowledge of the facts, despite contrary opinions by medical experts in response to hypothetical questions. As I read the majority opinion, it overrules sub silentio the foregoing cases yet provides no justification whatever for doing so.
I conclude that there was ample substantial evidence to support the board’s decision and, accordingly, I would affirm the decision.
McComb, J., and Clark, J., concurred.