holding that a plaintiff could recover for negligent in *1425 fliction of emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury; court’s holding was contrary to the Restatement position, and noted that the trend was toward abandonment of artificial barriers to recovery
How later courts described this case
- holding that a plaintiff could recover for negligent in *1425 fliction of emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury; court’s holding was contrary to the Restatement position, and noted that the trend was toward abandonment of artificial barriers to recovery
- holding that a plaintiff could recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury; court's holding was contrary to the Restatement position, and noted that the trend was toward abandonment of artificial barriers to recovery
- holding that “plaintiff should be permitted to 7 prove the nature of his relationship to the victim and the extent of damages he has suffered because of this relationship”
- noting that the right to maintain such an action “is a most unsettled question in the law of torts, an area ‘clearly in a process of growth, the ultimate limits of which cannot as yet be determined[ ]’ ” (quoting Prosser, Torts 50, § 12 (4th ed.1971)); (2
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING OPINION OF
LEVINSON, J.
In Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156 , 472 P.2d 509 (1970), a majority of this court held actionable, on a theory of tortious *414 infliction of psychic injury, a defendant’s negligent destruction of property which caused the plaintiff-owner to suffer mental distress. I dissented, based on “my disagreement with the policy of recognizing emotional ties to material objects and . . . the vast potential for abuse inherent in such a theory of recovery.” Id. at 178 , 472 P.2d at 522 . However, I also indicated that in my view protection of the interest to be free of emotional distress resulting from a defendant’s negligently inflicted “peril or harm to another closely or intimately related to the person disturbed,” insofar as it recognized emotional ties betweenpeopie, stood on a more acceptable legal footing. Id. at 179 , 472 P.2d at 523 .
I still disagree with the majority’s extension of legal protection to emotional ties to property contained in Rodrigues . However, I concur in the court’s holding in this case that the plaintiff has stated a valid claim for injury to his psyche caused by the defendant’s alleged negligence in causing the death of Mrs. Pittala, to whom the plaintiff claims both close emotional and familial ties. In this regard, I also concur in the court’s analysis of the standards applicable in measuring the genuineness of the plaintiff’s injury.