The opinion
DOOLING, J.
I concur in the judgment of this court reversing the order granting the temporary injunction. I do so reluctantly, not because I disagree with the result, but because in my opinion the question presented by the appeal is moot and the appeal should be dismissed for that reason; but since it takes the concurrence of two members of this court to order an appeal dismissed the appeal is before the court and must be decided on its merits. I cannot refrain, however, from a brief statement of the grounds upon which I base my conclusion that the appeal should have been dismissed.
The order granting the temporary injunction from which this appeal is taken was signed on October 28, 1948. It only enjoins the appellant from “entering upon, attending or being present at the race meeting presently being held by plaintiff.” At the hearing on October 28, 1948, the parties stipulated “that the horse race meeting of the Pacific Turf Club—the present racing days—will expire two days from now. ’ ’ The temporary injunction was served on appellant on November 1 and filed with the clerk on November 3, and the notice of appeal was filed on November 4, all after the expiration of the race meeting “presently being held,” which appellant was enjoined from attending.
The question was already moot at the time that the notice of appeal was filed. (E. J. Carroll Co., Ltd. v. Insurance Commr., 2 Cal.2d 60 [ 38 P.2d 780 ]; Fletcher v. Dexter, 60 Cal.App.2d 275 [ 140 P.2d 697 ]; Covina U. H. School v. California Interscholastic Fed., 136 Cal.App. 588 [ 29 P.2d 323 ].) An appellate court should not decide a moot case simply to establish a principle of law or because a party “might be able to utilize a favorable decision” in his future dealings. (Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. United A. A. & Agr. Imp. Workers, 27 Cal.2d 859, 865 [ 167 P.2d 725 ].)