The opinion
McINTYRE, Justice
(concurring specially), with HARNSBERGER, Chief Justice, joining in the special concurrence.
We concur in the result reached in the opinion of Justice Gray. Although there may be some ambiguity in § 21-233, W.S.1957, we think the legislative intent is clear. That intent was to deny a preponderant school district the ability, by virture of its large voting majority, to unduly overshadow the wishes of smaller school districts. As pointed out by Justice GRAY, it is of course within the prerogative of the legislature to provide any reasonable method it sees fit for the establishment, alteration and consolidation of school districts.
While the legislative intent in this instance is clear, we wish to erase, any possible implication that the word “elector” standing alone .always has been or always will be. taken, to mean a person, entitled to vote. Justice GRAY’s .opinion does not hold the word “elector” means every person qualified to vote at an election, but the purpose of this special concurrence is to remove any possible doubt if there should be in the future any question as to the correct interpretation or meaning to be given the term “elector” as used in our constitution and laws. Until a person qualified to exercise the privilege of voting actually takes advantage of his franchise, he does not become an elector.
. .This is not in conflict with anything held in previous opinions of this court, particularly State ex rel. Blair v. Brooks, 17 Wyo. 344 , 99 P. 874, 875 , 22 L.R.A.,N.S., 478; and Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Board of Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262 , 333 P.2d 700, 704 . The essence of the holdings in those cases is that the number of electors who actually voted in the election would be taken as the number of electors of the state, because it would be almost impossible to determine the actual number of qualified electors in the state at a particular election, and the courts must give some reasonable interpretation to the term “elector.”