"Religious beliefs are not matters to be used by governmental authorities to manipulate a suspect to say things he or she otherwise would not say. The right to worship without fear is too precious a freedom for us to tolerate an invasion and manipulation by state officials of the religious belief of individuals, including those accused of crime."
How later courts described this case
- "Religious beliefs are not matters to be used by governmental authorities to manipulate a suspect to say things he or she otherwise would not say. The right to worship without fear is too precious a freedom for us to tolerate an invasion and manipulation by state officials of the religious belief of individuals, including those accused of crime."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Shawn Garfield Price v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 409 (2001)
3 Cal.4th 959, 987 , overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13
Disapproved on other grounds by People v. Cunningham, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (2001)
3 Cal.4th 959, 981 , disapproved on another ground in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1045, 1069, fn. 13
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Martinez, 47 Cal. 4th 399 (2009)
jurors in the Hill case did not stress their strong opposition to the death penalty and did not state that the death penalty serves no purpose and “makes killers out of us” all — a view that cast doubt upon B.S.’s claim she could vote to impose the penalty of death in an appropriate case.
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I concur in the judgment. After review, I agree with my colleagues that there is no error or other defect that requires reversal or vacation.
I write separately merely to note a disturbing aspect of the trial: the prosecutor’s reference in summation to Bible verses assertedly “sanctioning ... the death penalty in cases like this.”
It is of course misconduct for a prosecutor to invoke purported religious law in support of the imposition of the penalty of death. Argument of this sort by a representative of the government offends California statutes and *1017 judicial decisions, which establish the positive, secular law of this state as the rale governing the choice between life and death (see People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 483-484 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ] (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.)). It also violates the United States and California Constitutions—including their respective clauses concerning establishment of religion (U.S. Const., Amend. I; Cal. Const., art. I, § 4), cruel and unusual punishments (U.S. Const., Amend. VIII; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17), and due process of law (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15).
The prosecutor here came perilously close to crossing the line into misconduct, but did not actually do so. For that reason, I need say no more— other than to strongly caution against such improper argument in the future. 1
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied January 20, 1993.
I note in passing that defendant has not preserved a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in this regard. That means only that he is not entitled to require that we review the point as a matter of right. It does not mean that we are somehow barred from undertaking such review ex mero motu. Plainly, albeit impliedly, the California Constitution obligates us to reverse a judgment that results from a miscarriage of justice. Any rule of less than constitutional stature that may be construed to prevent us from discharging our duty (see, e.g., Evid. Code, §§ 353, 354) is invalid to that extent. That said, there was no miscarriage of justice here.