holding that instructions on depraved mind murder were correctly refused when the defendant shot the victim a second time in the chest at close range
How later courts described this case
- holding that instructions on depraved mind murder were correctly refused when the defendant shot the victim a second time in the chest at close range
- holding that trial courts are required to instruct the jury "on every degree of homicide which the evidence in any reasonable view suggests”
- instructions on depraved-mind murder correctly refused where defendant shot victim a second time in the chest at close range
- pretrial notice requirement satisfied when evidence in question had already been introduced during the guilt phase
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LUMPKIN, Vice-Presiding Judge:
concurs in results.
I concur in the results reached by the Court in this case. However, I cannot join in the Court’s broad comment regarding the method of proof that no charges were filed as a result of Appellant’s contacts with Officer Schoenberger or the Court’s implication that a Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 , 108 S.Ct. 1860 , 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988), analysis is required in this case.
The Court’s comment regarding the available method of proof that charges were not filed as a result of the contacts with Officer Schoenberger does not recognize the restrictions placed on this type of evidence by 12 O.S.1981, § 2803. Therefore, the comment should not be read to amend the statutory requirements of admissibility.
The Court’s discussion of the supplemental proposition regarding the need for a Mills analysis infers that this type of review is required. However, it should be noted that Mills is not applicable to the *1376 Oklahoma capital sentencing procedure. The Maryland sentencing procedure is distinctly different from the procedure applied in Oklahoma. Therefore, the Court should refrain from creating either a misconception that Mills addresses the sentencing procedure utilized in Oklahoma or an additional nuance of legal fiction to confuse our criminal jurisprudence.