rationale of Brown upheld, but facts of Brown, involving plea to original charge, should have fallen within exception to same transaction rule
How later courts described this case
- rationale of Brown upheld, but facts of Brown, involving plea to original charge, should have fallen within exception to same transaction rule
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Knowles, 289 Or. 813 (1980)
Or Laws 1973, ch 836, §§ 1-359; State v. Hammang, 271 Or 749, 760, 534 P2d 501 (1975), overruled on other grounds by State v. Knowles, 289 Or 813, 822, 618 P2d 1245 (1980).
The opinion
TONGUE, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the position of the majority to the effect that it is “unreasonable” to permit a defendant, by pleading guilty to a lesser charge, to avoid prosecution on a more serious charge. I cannot agree with the majority, however, in its “interpretation” of OES 131.505 and 131.515 in such manner as to avoid that result.
To me, the terms of this statute, as enacted by the legislature in 1973, are clear and unambiguous and require, the contrary result for the reasons stated by the dissenting opinion by McAllister, J. In such a case I do not believe that this court, by the process of statutory “interpretation,” may properly avoid such a result on the ground that it is “unreasonable.”
In my view, when the legislature enacts a statute in clear and unambiguous language, as in this case, such language should be given effect by this court even though the result is one which the legislature did not intend. If the legislature did not intend such a result in this case, the legislature may correct the matter in its current session.
*763 In my opinion, for this court to attempt to correct the problem in this case on the ground that such a result is “unreasonable” is an invitation to the courts of this state to interpret all statutes in such a manner as to reach results deemed by courts to be “reasonable,” so as to avoid results deemed by the courts to be “unreasonable,” despite clear and unambiguous terms of a statute, as in this case. See Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., 270 Or 694 , 530 P2d 53 (1974), and dissenting opinion.
For these reasons I dissent.