declining to adopt doctrine of promissory estoppel because it “would allow parties to circumvent the U.C.C.” and joining “the other courts which limit the doctrine of promissory estoppel from overcoming a valid defense based on the statute of frauds contained within the Uniform Commercial Code”
How later courts described this case
- declining to adopt doctrine of promissory estoppel because it “would allow parties to circumvent the U.C.C.” and joining “the other courts which limit the doctrine of promissory estoppel from overcoming a valid defense based on the statute of frauds contained within the Uniform Commercial Code”
- The court refused to adopt as Washington law the concepts of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139 (§ 217A in the Tentative Drafts), advancing the rather surprising reason that the Restatement rule would defeat rather than promote uniformity among the several states. A principal purpose of the Restatement has been to promote reasoned uniformity
- holding "promissory estoppel cannot be used to overcome the statute of frauds in a case which involves the sale of goods"
- noting that, to prove the elements of promissory estoppel, a promisee may offer evidence of the course of dealing between the parties
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Rosellini, J.
(concurring specially) — I agree with the majority that, in order to preserve the integrity of the Uniform Commercial Code, the question submitted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals must be answered in the negative. It is evident that the legislature gave careful thought to the circumstances which would justify exceptions to the requirement of a written contract, and those exceptions are set forth in the act itself. They do not include circumstances which in other areas of law might invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
While the code makes no provision for relief under the theory of promissory estoppel, it does provide an exception to the requirement of a writing
*301 if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; . . .
RCW 62A.2-201 (3) (b).
There is in the District Court's findings some suggestion that there may have been such an admission here. If that were the case, the code itself would provide a remedy.
Hicks, J., concurs with Rosellini, J.