holding that when there is no clear legal answer to the defendant’s claim, the defendant has failed to establish plain error
How later courts described this case
- holding that when there is no clear legal answer to the defendant’s claim, the defendant has failed to establish plain error
- holding that error is not "plain" if reasonable judges could disagree as to whether error occurred
- a defendant’s failure to object at trial to the composition of his jury precluded his raising this issue in a petition for post-conviction relief
- an appellate court is to affirm a sentencing decision unless the decision is clearly mistaken
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
COATS, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion that the superior court did not err when it denied relief to Marrone on his post-conviction relief applications.
It seems to me that at a minimum Mar-rone must meet the high standard of showing “plain error” to prevail. See United States v. Frady, - U.S. -, -, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1593 , 71 L.Ed.2d 816, 829 (1982). I see no reason why he should be permitted to meet any lower standard on a post-conviction relief application than he would have to meet on a direct appeal. I believe the majority opinion amply demonstrates that this case does not present an unusual set of circumstances where a defendant might be excused from making a contemporaneous objection. Furthermore, the majority opinion amply demonstrates that the possibility of prejudice to Marrone from the instruction which he now attacks was minimal. The conclusion is inescapable that Marrone has not shown plain error and is not entitled to relief.
I see no reason to go further with any analysis to decide the case before us. I see the plain error rule as a safety valve which exists to allow a defendant relief from the contemporaneous objection rule in cases where applying the contemporaneous objection rule would result in injustice. Relief from the rule is allowed only in particularly compelling cases based upon the weighing of many factors. I hesitate to try to create a rule which attempts to set out when we will give relief under the plain error rule.
I am particularly hesitant to decide when, if ever, a party might not have to comply with the contemporaneous objection rule to preserve an error for purposes of appeal or post-conviction relief. See Engle v. Isaac, - U.S. -, -, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 802 (1982). For me it is sufficient to conclude that in the case before us Marrone was required to object to preserve any error pertaining to the instruction.