rejecting interpretation of “special taxes” in one section of the proposition as meaning “any taxes” because (1) such interpretation would require “read[ing] the word ‘special’ out of the phrase ‘special taxes’ ” and (2) the language of another section of the same proposition showed that its “drafters knew how to say ‘any’ taxes when that is what they meant”
How later courts described this case
- rejecting interpretation of “special taxes” in one section of the proposition as meaning “any taxes” because (1) such interpretation would require “read[ing] the word ‘special’ out of the phrase ‘special taxes’ ” and (2) the language of another section of the same proposition showed that its “drafters knew how to say ‘any’ taxes when that is what they meant”
- statutory provisions should be interpreted to give all terms their full effect
- "In construing the words of a statute or constitutional provision to discern its purpose, the provisions should be read together; an interpretation which would render terms surplusage should be avoided, and every word should be given some significance, leaving no part useless or devoid of meaning."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled implicitly by Rider v. County of San Diego, 1 Cal. 4th 1 (1991)
Rider, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1 effectively overruled the Farrell
The opinion
RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent.
For the reasons expressed at length so recently in my dissenting opinion in Los Angeles County Transportation Com. v. Richmond (1982) 31 Cal.3d 197, 209-219 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 643 P.2d 941 ], I conclude that petitioner’s payroll and gross receipts tax is invalid. Not having drawn the support of any of my colleagues, I believe that no useful purpose would be served by repeating my analysis here. Nonetheless, I conclude that this tax is a “special tax” which is constitutionally deficient because it was not approved by “two-thirds vote of the qualified electors” of the City and County of San Francisco (City), as required by article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution.
Using a very restricted interpretation of the term “special tax,” the majority decides that petitioner’s tax is exempt from the limitations of the constitutional provision. The majority thereby widens still further the hole which they have cut in that protective fence which the people of California thought they had constructed around their collective purse by the adoption of article XIII A, a fence which the majority first breached in Richmond .
*58 In effect, petitioner City is allowed to replace the general revenues concededly lost to it by article XIII A’s limitation on real property taxes through the simple device of a new tax, adopted by a bare majority rather than by a “two-thirds” vote of the electorate. The purpose of the new tax remains identical with that of the old—namely, to increase the general revenue of City. Thus, the constitutional limitations of section 4 are easily circumvented except in that extremely narrow category of taxes which the majority defines as “special.” With due respect to my colleagues, it seems to me that the majority thereby rejects the clearly expressed intent of the people.
I remain mystified as to how, as the majority claims (ante, p. 57), such an interpretation “will provide the voters with the ‘effective’ property tax relief” which we identified as the purpose of article XIII A in Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 231 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 239 , 583 P.2d 1281 ].
I would deny the petition.