explaining that "'the sentencing authority ... must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation ... [and] that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in the circumstances" (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that "'the sentencing authority ... must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation ... [and] that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in the circumstances" (internal quotation marks omitted)
- explaining that an attorney "acts' as an assistant for his client, and not as a master" (citations omitted)
- stating that no specific weight is to be assigned to individual aggravating and mitigating factors and that all cireumstances must be weighed when considering the appropriateness of the penalty
- noting that the defendant must "prove much more than [the fact that] he had been drinking" before committing the offense to be entitled to a voluntary intoxication defense, and that the defendant must "show that his mind had been affected to such an extent that he did not have the capacity to form the requisite specific intent or purpose"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by State v. Eloge, 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (1988)
Neither of the two cases relied upon by defendant deals with the issue of mandated psychological evaluation in a non-capital case, and we decline to extend our narrow holding in Wood to this case.
The opinion
HALL, Chief Justice
(concurring in the result):
I concur in affirming the defendant’s conviction.
In regard to the issues raised on appeal pertaining to the sentencing phase of the trial, I view as dispositive the fact that the trial judge erred in refusing to apply the standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt in determining the sentence to be imposed upon the defendant. I therefore concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court which remands this case to the trial judge for the purpose of resentencing in accordance with the provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 76-3-207(3).
HOWE, J., does not participate herein.