holding that, despite the normal rule that a plea of guilty or no contest waives all non-jurisdictional defects in a criminal prosecution, the State and a defendant can agree that the defendant will plead no contest on condition that the defendant be allowed to pursue an issue on appeal — so long as this issue was litigated in the trial court, and so long as the resolution of this issue is dispositive of the defendant’s case
How later courts described this case
- holding that, despite the normal rule that a plea of guilty or no contest waives all non-jurisdictional defects in a criminal prosecution, the State and a defendant can agree that the defendant will plead no contest on condition that the defendant be allowed to pursue an issue on appeal — so long as this issue was litigated in the trial court, and so long as the resolution of this issue is dispositive of the defendant’s case
- holding that parties can agree that defendant will plead no contest on condition that defendant be allowed to pursue an issue on appeal, as long as the issue was litigated in the trial court and its resolution is dispositive to the case
- where defense requests psychiatric report resulting in delay, it shares responsibility with district attorney to bring psychiatric report to attention of trial judge so that case may be recalendared: "To hold otherwise would tend to transform the speedy trial rule into a hyper-technical device to be manipulated by an accused in order to escape the administration of justice.”
- allowing courts to accept a special plea agreement where the defendant pleads no contest but maintains a limited right to appeal a specified, litigated, and dispositive issue
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disapproved on other grounds by Miller v. State, 1980 Alas. LEXIS 728 (1980)
See Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Alaska 1974), disapproved of on other grounds by, Miller v. State, 617 P.2d 516, 519 n. 6 (Alaska 1980); State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584, 586-92 (La.1976).
The opinion
ERWIN, Justice
(concurring).
I agree that failure to honor the condition that appellant be allowed a limited right to appeal on the speedy trial issue would render his nolo contendere plea unintelligent and involuntary and require that it be vacated. Accordingly, I join in the court’s decision to grant review on this issue and specifically concur with the court’s resolution of it. However, I reach this decision only because I view the speedy trial issue to be an allegation of a jurisdictional defect. Hence, this case falls within the general rule that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere does not bar appeal of a jurisdictional issue. 1
When a defendant is not brought to trial within the 120-day period defined in Criminal Rule 45, 2 the state is barred from further prosecution and the court is effectively deprived of jurisdiction over the offense set forth in the information or indictment. 3 A claim that the 120-day pe *1261 riod has been violated is thus akin to a claim that the indictment or information fails to state an offense, 4 that the underlying statute is unconstitutional, 5 or that prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations 6 — all claims of jurisdictional defects traditionally held to be appealable after pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. Hence, a plea of nolo contendere conditioned on the right to appeal an alleged 120-day rule violation is proper even under the prevailing view that pleas may be conditioned only upon the right to appeal jurisdictional issues. 7
I recognize that there is a minority view that a plea conditioned upon a limited right to appeal certain non-jurisdictional issues should be condoned because it would be contrary to sound notions of judicial administration to require a defendant to undergo a costly and possibly lengthy trial when all but one issue could be quickly disposed of by a conditioned plea. However, analysis of the cases espousing this view reveals that, for the most part, the precise non-jurisdictional grounds which are proper subjects of conditioned pleas are usually set forth in a court rule or statute. 8 In the absence of such a rule or statute, 9 I am reluctant to burden the trial judge with the additional responsibility of determining without guidance whether a particular non-jurisdictional issue in a proposed conditioned plea would possibly render the plea unintelligent and involuntary. I would therefore adopt the majority view 10 that accepting pleas of guilty or nolo contendere conditioned upon a limited right of appeal on non-jurisdictional grounds is prohibited.
. See United States v. Mizell, 488 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1973); 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 175, at 379-80 (1969).
. See note l of majority opinion supra.
. See State v. Clouatre, 516 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Alaska 1973).
. See, e. g., Kolaski v. United States, 362 F.2d 847, 848 (5th Cir. 1966).
. See, e. g., United States v. Ury, 106 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939).
. See, e. g., United States v. Harris, 133 F. Supp. 796, 799 (W.D.Mo.1955).
. See United States v. DeCosta, 435 F.2d 630, 632 (1st Cir. 1970) (court reached speedy trial question following guilty plea).
. See note 10 of the majority opinion supra and the cases cited in United States v. Mizell, 488 F.2d 97, 99-100 (5th Cir. 1973).
. Alaska R.Crim.P. 11(e) controlling plea bargaining agreements fails to provide any standards for accepting conditional pleas. See note 2 of the majority opinion supra,
. See note 1 supra.