stating that "a mental health care professional's opinion is necessary to determine a defendant's amenability to treatment" (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- stating that "a mental health care professional's opinion is necessary to determine a defendant's amenability to treatment" (emphasis added)
- "Had this issue been before us, I would have found that deliberate cruelty on the part of Mr. Strauss was demonstrated and that it justified the imposition of the exceptional sentence in this case. The State did not, however, cross-appeal on this issue and, as the majority opinion correctly notes, the law of the case doctrine prevents our considering it at this point."
- affirming trial court’s admission of victim’s statement regarding sexual assault made over three hours after assault under the excited utterance exception
- requiring mental health care professional’s opinion in absence of prior record of treatment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
119 Wn.2d 401, 418 , 832 P.2d 78 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L. Ed. 2d 177
The opinion
*422 Andersen, J.
(concurring) — I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to express my disagreement with the Court of Appeals determination in its published opinion that Mr. Strauss did not demonstrate deliberate cruelty toward his rape victim. State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419 , 773 P.2d 898 (1989). Based on this record I could not have found that the trial judge's finding in that regard was "clearly erroneous". It appears that the conduct of Mr. Strauss was significantly more egregious and serious than typical of the crime of rape in the second degree. State v. Hicks, 61 Wn. App. 923, 928 , 812 P.2d 893 (1991); State v. Holyoak, 49 Wn. App. 691, 696 , 745 P.2d 515 (1987), review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1007 (1988). Had this issue been before us, I would have found that deliberate cruelty on the part of Mr. Strauss was demonstrated and that it justified the imposition of the exceptional sentence in this case. The State did not, however, cross-appeal on this issue and, as the majority opinion correctly notes, the law of the case doctrine prevents our considering it at this point.
Brachtenbach and Guy, JJ., concur with Andersen, J.