refusing to disturb an apportioned jury award because “the jury could reasonably conclude” from the evidence that the apportionment was appropriate
How later courts described this case
- refusing to disturb an apportioned jury award because “the jury could reasonably conclude” from the evidence that the apportionment was appropriate
- the objection, “I take general exception to the failure to give Plaintiff’s Requested Instructions,” was insufficient to give the court notice of error
- objection to jury instruction must be specific enough to give the trial court notice of every error in the instruction complained of on appeal
- "The matter of witness credibility ... falls within the provinee of the fact-finder."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting).
For the following reasons, I dissent.
Plaintiff suffered severe multiple fractures and was hospitalized for months. He sustained a later fracture of the leg at the point of the bore holes, which were made in the process of repairing the bones injured by this accident. He has suffered, and will continue to suffer, pain from the injuries he sustained. He has a permanent total disability of 20-25% as a consequence of this accident. Initially, the jury found the plaintiff had suffered no general damages for pain and suffering, no temporary or permanent disability, and no loss of past or future earnings. The jury was instructed *534 to deliberate longer on general damages. The jury returned three minutes later with an award of One Dollar for general damages.
In my view, such a determination by the jury indicates the jury was actuated either by an improper motive, bias, prejudice, or misunderstanding of the law, in arriving at its verdict of One Dollar for general damages.
Plaintiff contends that failure to instruct the jury about the legal consequences of its apportionment of negligence leads to a harsh and unfair result. This failure to so instruct, according to plaintiff, is inimical to the interest of justice and should be disapproved by this Court. Plaintiff concedes he did not specifically request such an instruction, but such a gesture would have been futile. In McGinn v. Utah Power and Light Co., Utah, 529 P.2d 423 (1974), this Court ruled it was prejudicial error if, in a comparative negligence case, the trial court instructed the comparative negligence case, the trial court instructed the jury as to the effect or impact of its fact-finding answers, in a special verdict would have on the outcome of the case. Plaintiff urges this Court to reassess the McGinn ruling. I would do so.