The opinion
*493 SCHWAB, C. J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion. However, I wish to dispel any implication that Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US 471 , 92 S.Ct 2593 , 33 L Ed 2d 484 (1972), can be construed as holding that the United States Constitution requires a system of appellate review of parole board orders — be they orders denying or revoking parole, or orders modifying the conditions of parole previously granted. We have, and I think properly, resolved this case on a point which the parties did not raise by determining that our statutes do not provide for appellate review by this court of parole board orders denying as distinguished from revoking parole.
The 1973 legislature made extensive changes in the procedures required to be followed by the parole board. Broadly speaking, the legislature created two classifications of parole board hearings — one classification dealing with hearings considering the granting of parole, and the other classification dealing with hearings considering the revocation of parole or the modification of the conditions of parole previously granted. The legislature, albéit by ambiguous language, provided for judicial review by this court of orders in the revocation and modification classification, but did not provide for review by this court of orders entered pursuant to hearings that determine whether and under what conditions parole should be granted. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, deals only with the constitutional requirements of a revocation hearing. It does not even imply that a system of judicial review of parole board action of any nature is a constitutional requirement.