recognizing Nuway Laundry’s principles and considering whether evidence showed temporary change of condition necessitating heart transplant surgery
How later courts described this case
- recognizing Nuway Laundry’s principles and considering whether evidence showed temporary change of condition necessitating heart transplant surgery
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ALMA WILSON, Justice,
dissenting:
The record of this case clearly shows that, by agreement of the parties, the Workers’ Compensation Court entered orders on October 20,1983, and on November 22, 1983. The orders awarded workers’ compensation benefits to Wilton Ray Gil-lum [Claimant] for personal injury to the heart (myocardial infarction) arising out of and in the course of Claimant’s employment with Bill Hodges Truck Company, Inc. [Respondent]. The parties agreed that as a result of this job related heart injury, Claimant suffered permanent and total disability. This job induced disability, though permanent, nevertheless required continuing medical treatment for the purpose of sustaining Claimant’s very life. Both parties, and the Court, acknowledged this fact, as evidenced by the terms of the Court *1070 sanctioned agreed order, which provided as follows:
“THAT respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred by claimant as a result of said injury.”
Contrary to the terms of the parties agreed order, Respondent now refuses to pay for reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred by the Claimant as a result of his on-the-job heart injury. The majority opinion approves Respondent’s refusal to honor its agreement on the ground that there was no “causal nexus” shown between the job induced heart injury and the need for a heart transplant, despite the admission that Claimant’s physicians advised that a heart transplant is necessary and the only treatment left for Claimant. The admissions, agreements and stipulations of the parties in this case provide the evidentiary “causal nexus” between the job induced heart injury and the necessity for the heart transplantation procedure. Where stipulations have been entered into, the parties will not be allowed to withdraw therefrom, without consent of the other party, except by leave of court upon cause shown. Smith v. Owens, 397 P.2d 673 (Okla.1963).
Additionally, the provisions of the parties agreed order partake the nature of a settlement agreement. Ordinarily, courts favor compromising disputes by written agreements fairly and honestly made, and when so made, they are binding on the parties thereto. Prather v. Butler, 70 P.2d 106 , 180 Okl. 462 (1937). When such agreements are not enforced by the Courts, confidence in any agreement procedure short of trial on all issues is threatened.
I would, thus, save for another day the question whether or not job related injuries to vital organs shall, by judicial interpretation, fall under “a separate rubric of compensation”, distinguishable from other job related injuries which permanently affect a bodily part, although there is nothing in the Workers’ Compensation Act which excludes coverage of vital organs of the body.