The opinion
TRAYNOR, J.
I concur in the judgment. It is settled that certiorari does not lie to review an appealable order. (Cal. Code Civ. Proe., sec. 1068; see cases cited in 4 Cal.Jur. 1036 et seq.) Section 963 of the Code of Civil Procedure lists among appealable orders, “any special order made after final judgment.” Since the order of August 19, 1942, was a special order made after final judgment it was appealable and certiorari is therefore not available. The majority opinion takes the view, however, that the order in question was appealable not simply because it was a special order after final judgment but also because it was made pursuant to an established method of procedure, in this case, section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is my opinion that any special order after final judgment that affects the judgment (see 2 Cal.Jur. 153) is appealable whether or not it is made pursuant to a prescribed rule of procedure. The exception of orders that are not authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure was first read into section 963 in 1927 in the case of Stanton v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. 478 [ 261 P. 1001 ], in disregard of numerous cases of long standing. (Livermore v. Campbell, 52 Cal. 75 ; In re Bullock, 75 Cal. 419 [ 17 P. 540 ]; White v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. 54 [ 42 P. 471 ]; Anglo-California Bank *568 v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. 753 [ 96 P. 803 ] ; Hildebrand v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. 86 [ 159 P. 147 ] ; Magee v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.App. 154 [ 101 P. 532 ]; for additional eases see 2 Cal.Jur. 184 and 4 Cal.Jur. 1036 et seq.)
The holding in the Stanton case that section 963 “contemplates orders given by a court having jurisdiction to act” ( 202 Cal. 478, 489 ) would apply as well to final judgments, for both final judgments and orders after such judgments are made appealable in the same terms. No condition that the court must have jurisdiction to act is set forth with respect to either, and there is no more justification for adding such a condition in the one ease than in the other. The Stanton case and those based upon it have departed from established principles without adequate consideration of the authorities. These cases should be overruled and the law restored to its traditional pattern as described in White v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. 54 [ 42 P. 471 ], at 57: “The order in question is a special order, made after final judgment, and, as such, is made the subject of appeal by express terms of the statute (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 939, subd. 3; sec. 963, subd. 2; Slavonic etc. Assn. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 500 [ 4 P. 500 ]; Livermore v. Campbell, 52 Cal. 75 ; Calderwood v. Peyser, 42 Cal. 110 ); and, being so appealable, it cannot be reviewed by certiorari.
“Nor does it make any difference in this respect if the order be, as contended, in excess of the jurisdiction of the court making it, and consequently void. Void judgments and orders are not the less appealable by reason of that fact (Livermore v. Campbell, supra; and when that remedy is afforded it excludes the right to certiorari, notwithstanding the order be void in the extreme sense. (People v. Shepard, 28 Cal. 115 ; Stoddard v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. 303 [ 41 P. 278 ].) ‘It may be readily admitted,’ says Mr. Justice McFarland in delivering the opinion of the court in the case last cited, ‘that the court had no jurisdiction to make the order; but, as the order is appealable, certiorari will not lie, because it lies only when “there is no appeal.” ’
“So far, then, as the remedy by certiorari is concerned, it would be wholly unprofitable to consider the question as to jurisdiction of the respondent to make the order complained of.”
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.