People v. Mendoza

MOSK, J.—I

generally concur in the opinion of the court.

I write separately because I believe that the result that we reach may be obtained by an even straighter path.

A person may be vicariously liable for another’s crime as an aider and abettor if he knows of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and intends its object. {People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 60 , 674 P.2d 1318 ].) He need not commit the act, or possess the mental state, required for the crime itself. {People v. Cray (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 12, fn. 5 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 710 P.2d 392 ].)

The question presented in this cause is whether a person who is charged with a crime and prosecuted as an aider and abettor may introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication as to his knowledge and/or intent, and whether a jury may consider such evidence in determining these issues.

Penal Code section 22 has, as its purpose, to render voluntary intoxication, in and of itself, immaterial to the commission of a crime—in a word, to disallow any argument by a defendant that “I would not have done what I did, and would not have possessed the mental state that I possessed, had I not been in the condition of voluntary intoxication.” It has always dealt with voluntary intoxication and the elements of a crime, specifically, the mental elements thereof. Formerly, it was phrased in terms of allowing the jury to *1136 consider a defendant’s voluntary intoxication in order to “determin[e]” his “purpose, motive, or intent,” “whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime . . . .” (1872 Pen. Code, § 22.) Presently, it is phrased in terms of declaring that “[e]vidence” that the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated is “admissible,” albeit “solely,” “on the issue of whether or not [he] actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether [he] premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought.” (Pen. Code, § 22, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1995, ch. 793, § 1; accord, Pen. Code, § 22, as amended by Stats. 1982, ch. 893, § 2, pp. 3317-3318; Pen. Code, § 22, as amended by Stats. 1981, ch. 404, § 2, pp. 1591-1592.)

Penal Code section 22 has nothing to do with aiding and abetting, which is not itself a crime but rather a theory of vicarious liability of one person for the crime of another, and has nothing to do with aiding and abetting’s prerequisites of knowledge and intent, which are not themselves elements of a crime but rather conditions for the attachment of such vicarious liability.

With that said, the answer to the question presented proves to be affirmative: A person who is charged with a crime and prosecuted as an aider and abettor may introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication as to his knowledge and/or intent, and a jury may consider such evidence in determining these issues. The reason is this. As a general rule, all relevant evidence is admissible (Evid. Code, § 351) and hence may be taken into account. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove a material issue. (Id., § 210.) Plainly, evidence of voluntary intoxication has some such tendency to disprove the knowledge and/or intent prerequisites for aiding and abetting. No exception obtains to render evidence of this sort inadmissible. Certainly, none can be found in Penal Code section 22 itself. To be sure, the provision implies that “[ejvidence of voluntary intoxication” is inadmissible except “on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought.” (Pen. Code, § 22, subd. (b).) To the extent that such implication covers the defendant and the mental elements of a crime, it makes sense, arising as it does from a measure devoted thereto. But to the extent that it is stretched beyond, it does not. Otherwise, one would be forced to conclude that evidence of voluntary intoxication would be inadmissible even on such an issue as the credibility of a witness, including the defendant, based on his condition at the time of the events and/or the time of trial—a result that would certainly be untenable (see, e.g., People v. Barnett (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1050-1052 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 88 ] [admissibility of evidence *1137 of voluntary intoxication at time of trial as to credibility]; People v. Singh (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 128, 129 [ 64 P.2d 1149 ] [admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication at time of events as to credibility]; People v. Salladay (1913) 22 Cal.App. 552, 554 [ 135 P. 508 ] [same]; People v. Haydon (1912) 18 Cal.App. 543, 563-565 [ 123 P. 1102 ] [admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication at time of trial as to credibility]).