holding that a false light claim requires pleading and proof of special damages
How later courts described this case
- holding that a false light claim requires pleading and proof of special damages
- false light invasion of privacy claim based on defamatory language
- discussing reasons why restrictions on defamation actions should be applied to actions for false light
- “The overwhelming majority of decisions in other 19 jurisdictions enforce defamation restrictions in actions for false light invasion of privacy when such actions are based on a defamatory publication.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BIRD, C. J.
I concur. I write separately because I think it is imperative at this time in our history that we give serious thought to the minority view expressed by Justices Goldberg and Douglas in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 686 , 84 S.Ct. 710 ].
In my opinion, “sunlight is the most powerful of all disinfectants . . . .” (See Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States (1961) p. 61.) That “sunlight” in a democracy is provided in large part by the press.
For all its momentary power, the press as an institution is quite fragile. Although those who from time to time have suffered its slings arid arrows may dispute that fact, it is a reality. To be truly free, the press must feel free—free to be wise and free to be foolish; free to be constructive and free to be destructive; free to be impartial and free to be unfair. That can only be accomplished if it knows that it has an “absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow from excesses and abuses.” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at p. 298 [ 11 L.Ed.2d at p. 719 ] (conc. opn. of Goldberg, J.).) The press will never feel free if it is chilled by codification.
“The prized American right ‘to speak one’s mind,’ cf. Bridges v. California [1941] 314 U.S. 252, 270 , about public officials and affairs needs ‘breathing space to survive,’ (N.A.A.C.P. v. Button [1963] 371 U.S. 415, 433 .) The right should not depend upon a probing by the jury of the motivation of the citizen or press. The theory of our Constitution is that every citizen may speak his mind and every newspaper express its view on matters of public concern and may not be barred from speaking or publishing because those in control of government think that what is said or written is unwise, unfair, false, or malicious. In a democratic society, one who *253 assumes to act for the citizens in an executive, legislative, or judicial capacity must expect that his official acts will be commented upon and criticized. Such criticism cannot, in my opinion, be muzzled or deterred by the courts at the instance of public officials under the label of libel.” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at pp. 298-299 [ 11 L.Ed.2d at p. 719 ] (conc. opn. of Goldberg, J.).)