discussing and adopting Section 46; noting that “[t]he limits imposed in § 46 of the Restatement, together with the jury’s common sense, should prove to be adequate protection against fraudulent or frivolous claims”
How later courts described this case
- discussing and adopting Section 46; noting that “[t]he limits imposed in § 46 of the Restatement, together with the jury’s common sense, should prove to be adequate protection against fraudulent or frivolous claims”
- holding language in handbook which contrasted "probationary" at will employee with "permanent" employee implied "permanent" employee could only be discharged for cause
- Distinction between probationary and permanent employee, with an explanation that a probationary employee may be discharged at any time during the probationary period, was sufficient to imply that a permanent employee could only be discharged for cause.
- "By listing misconduct that could result in discharge, the handbooks imply that cause is required."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
THOMAS, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree that the summary judgment in this case which was entered in favor of American Colloid Company must be reversed. I do not agree that the court should go further and require the entry of a summary judgment in favor of Leithead with respect to the proposition that the documents presented in this instance demonstrate an employment other than at will as a matter of law. In this instance the court has encountered one of those situations discussed in Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, Wyo., 704 P.2d 702, 706 (1985), in this way:
“This is not to say that the existence of a handbook or employer’s manual will make employment other than at will in all instances. Each case must be considered on its own merits. Some handbooks or manuals may not contain provisions which negate the employment at will. Some handbooks or manuals may be ambiguous or may not have apparent meaning, making the determination of their effect on at will employment a question of fact. * * * If the meaning of a contract is ambiguous or not apparent, it may be necessary to determine the intention of the parties from evidence other than the contract itself, and interpretation becomes a mixed question of law and fact. * * * ”
I would treat with the employee handbooks which were introduced into evidence in this case in accordance with the quoted language from Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, supra. I would reverse the summary judgment in favor of American Colloid Company, but I would extend the scope of the trial to the factual question of the effect of language in these employee handbooks which I perceive not to be sufficiently apparent to justify a conclusion that this was a contract of employment as a matter of law. In my judgment their effect on at will employment in this instance is a question of fact, but certainly at the very least they are sufficiently ambiguous to require a determination of the intention of the par *1069 ties from evidence other than the contract itself.