noting that ten states permit public employees to strike "unless such strikes endanger the public health, safety, or welfare" and explaining that "[t]he statutes generally prohibit strikes by police and fire-protection employees, employees in correctional facilities, and those in health-care institutions"
How later courts described this case
- noting that ten states permit public employees to strike "unless such strikes endanger the public health, safety, or welfare" and explaining that "[t]he statutes generally prohibit strikes by police and fire-protection employees, employees in correctional facilities, and those in health-care institutions"
- noting the original prohibition of strikes by federal employees in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947
- reviewing and answering the standard objections to public sector strikes.
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KAUS, J.
I concur in the judgment insofar as it holds that a peaceful strike by public employees does not give rise to a tort action for damages against the union. I am aware of nothing in the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act which suggests that the Legislature intended that common law tort remedies should be applied in this context, and without such legislative endorsement I believe it is improper to import tort remedies that were devised for different situations into this sensitive labor relations arena. As this court noted in City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper (1975) 13 Cal.3d 898, 917 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 707 , 534 P.2d 403 ]: “The question as to what sanctions should appropriately be imposed on public employees who engage in illegal strike activity is a complex one which, in itself, raises significant issues of public policy. In the past, several states have attempted to deter public employee strikes by imposing mandatory draconian statutory sanctions on striking employees; experience has all too frequently demonstrated, however, that such harsh, automatic sanctions do not prevent strikes but instead are counterproductive, exacerbating employer-employee friction and prolonging work stoppages.” In the absence of a determination by the Legislature that a tort action, resulting in a money damage award determined by a jury many years after the strike, is the appropriate method for dealing with public employee strikes, I do not believe the judiciary should, on its own, embrace this “solution” to the problem. (See, e.g., Lamphere Sch. v. Lamphere Fed. of Teachers (1977) 400 Mich. 104 [ 252 N.W.2d 818, 827-832 , 84 A.L.R.3d 314 ]; City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, etc. (W.Va. 1980) 283 S.E.2d 589, 592-595 ; contra State v. Kansas City Firefighting Local 42
*593 (Mo.App. 1984) 672 S.W.2d 99, 107-116 .) I would therefore disapprove the contrary holding in Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 100, 111-114 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 41 ].
In concluding that a common law tort action does not lie in these circumstances, it is not necessary to determine whether such a strike is “legal” or “illegal” in an abstract sense, or whether, and under what circumstances, such a strike could properly be enjoined. The question of injunctive relief presents significantly different considerations than the propriety of a tort action, and it is not before us in this case. We should await the facts of a concrete dispute before we attempt to resolve it.
Finally, I believe it is equally unwise to venture an opinion on potential constitutional challenges to future legislative action in this field. In my view, we should—if anything—be encouraging the Legislature to attempt to deal with the difficult public policy questions in this area, not frightening it away with premature warnings of possible constitutional minefields.
Reynoso, J., concurred.