stating that 16 “[d]uplication of damages or double recovery for injuries received is not permissible” 17 and “[w]here there are different theories of recovery and liability is found on each, 18 but the relief requested was the same . . ., the injured party is entitled to [recover a 19 particular type of damages] award [only once]”
How later courts described this case
- stating that 16 “[d]uplication of damages or double recovery for injuries received is not permissible” 17 and “[w]here there are different theories of recovery and liability is found on each, 18 but the relief requested was the same . . ., the injured party is entitled to [recover a 19 particular type of damages] award [only once]”
- stating that “[duplication of damages or double recovery for injuries received is not permissible” and “[w]here there are different theories of recovery and liability is found on each, but the relief requested was the same . . ., the injured party is entitled to [recover a particular type of damages] award [only once]”
- holding that duplication of damages or double recovery is impermissible
- stating that New Mexico bars double recovery and duplication of damages
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RIORDAN, Justice (dissenting).
In contrast to what our opinion says about the issues, the appellant does not allege that the trial court invaded the province of the jury by changing the negligence amount of the verdict by reduction in the amount of $13,500.
This issue is raised by the author because of his dissatisfaction with McKinney v. Smith, 63 N.M. 477 , 322 P.2d 110 (1958). In McKinney, after the jury was discharged, the unsuccessful party obtained an affidavit from the jury that impeached their verdict. The court then entered a judgment contrary to the verdict and in conformance with the affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed.
In this case, appellant concedes that the trial court properly subtracted the amount of damages awarded for breach of warranty ($13,500) from the $50,000 verdict awarded by the jury for negligence based upon the statement by the foreman of the jury that the $13,500 breach of warranty award was included in the $50,000 verdict. Appellant admits that he could not recover twice for the same amount but, rather, that he is entitled to recover under both breach of warranty and negligence.
I agree with the majority that he is required to elect in this case because of the nature of the general instructions submitted to the court by counsel. But, if properly instructed, I believe that recovery on both theories would be allowed. See Merrill Iron and Steel, Inc. v. Minn-Dak Seeds, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 652 (N.D.1983).
Finally, I believe there were sufficient facts in this case to require submission of the punitive damages issue to the jury, and the court erred in granting a directed verdict on that issue.