The opinion
WELCH, Justice
(concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
I fully concur in the result of the majority opinion, but cannot approve and concur in the manner in which the majority opinion deals with our former decisions.
In my view the facts stated in the majority opinion distinguish this case from the decisions in all the cited former cases. No former decision is cited in a case where as here, one elected to public office was prosecuted for crime and was removed' from such office in and by a judgment that he was guilty of the crime wherein one of the prescribed penalties was removal from office, but an appeal was allowed and was taken to the Criminal Court of Appeals and that court fully reversed' said judgment of conviction in toto, thereby fully invalidating and vacating the judgment of conviction and all penalties thereby inflicted, including the adjudged' forfeiture of office.
In such case the result is that the judgment of conviction and of forfeiture of office never became final. The office was never forfeited, and as an incident to the-office plaintiff was entitled to the salary thereof.
See 51 O.S.1951 § 8, which provides ½ material substance as follows:
“Every office shall become vacant on the happening of either of the following events * * *:
“Fifth. Conviction of any infamous crime or any offense involving a violation of his official oath; provided, that no conviction, as a cause of vacation of office, shall be deemed complete so long as an appeal may be pending, or until final judgment is rendered thereon.”
It seems to me that the fixed policy of our law requires affirmance of the judgment here under consideration.