“Significant evidence [a juvenile may wish to present at a waiver hearing] may well exist only in the knowledge of the juvenile. As to the circumstances and gravity of the offenses alleged, the juvenile may be the only witness who can present any mitigating circumstances for the court to consider.”
How later courts described this case
- “Significant evidence [a juvenile may wish to present at a waiver hearing] may well exist only in the knowledge of the juvenile. As to the circumstances and gravity of the offenses alleged, the juvenile may be the only witness who can present any mitigating circumstances for the court to consider.”
- “[t]he result of a fitness hearing is not a final adjudi- cation of guilt; but the certification of a juvenile offender to an adult court has been accurately characterized as ‘the worst punishment the juvenile system is empowered to inflict’”
- where the minor bears the burden to produce substantial evidence that he/she is amenable to treatment if charged with specified felonies
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63 (1989)
We distinguished our earlier holding in Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 [210 Cal.Rptr. 204, 693 P.2d 789], since that case involved the use of legislatively compelled self-incriminatory statements or testimony, in contrast to statements merely violative of Miranda.
Distinguished by People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309 (1988)
) In this regard, Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d 802, is distinguishable on the further ground that its rule of use immunity was adopted in the face of conflicting signals from the federal courts regarding the necessity of such a remedy under the federal Constitution.
The opinion
GRODIN, J., Concurring.
I understand the majority to hold that California’s privilege against self-incrimination is violated unless a juvenile is provided with use immunity for statements he makes to a probation officer or testimony he gives at a fitness hearing. To reach that conclusion, we must necessarily find that a juvenile’s testimony is compelled by the nature of the fitness proceeding. The proceeding combines relaxed evidentiary rules, a relatively low burden of proof, and, most importantly, a presumption of unfitness. Taken together, these factors create a substantial likelihood that *812 the juvenile will be found unfit unless he testifies in his own behalf. I believe that this risk of an adverse judgment is so great that it constitutes a compulsive sanction against exercise of the self-incrimination privilege. For these reasons, which I believe are implicit in the majority opinion, I concur.
The petition of real party in interest for a rehearing was denied April 4, 1985. The opinion was modified to read as printed above. Lucas, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.