holding that voluntary juvenile fitness hearing statements may not be used as substantive evidence of guilt but are admissible for sole purpose of impeachment during subsequent related trial
How later courts described this case
- holding that voluntary juvenile fitness hearing statements may not be used as substantive evidence of guilt but are admissible for sole purpose of impeachment during subsequent related trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BAXTER, J., Concurring.
I agree that statements to a probation officer in anticipation of a fitness hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (c)) are admissible for impeachment. I therefore join in the judgment.
I do not agree, however, that we should reaffirm the rule of Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 810 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ] (Ramona R.) that such statements are otherwise inadmissible and may not be used as substantive evidence of guilt. The plurality acknowledge that Ramona R. reflects a judicially created use immunity, an exclusionary rule crafted to encourage minors to cooperate with the probation officer. The basis on which the Ramona R. court held that the California use immunity rule for statements to a probation officer was not nullified by the “Truth-in-Evidence” provision of the California Constitution (art. I, § 28, subd. (d)) was a conclusion that admission of the statements would violate the California constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, which by virtue of Evidence Code section 940, created a privilege that survived Proposition 8. (Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 808-810.) As the court correctly explained, albeit in dictum, in People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], and as Justice Grodin noted in his concurring opinion in Ramona R., supra, at page 811, the reason Ramona R. held that admission of the minor’s statements would violate the privilege against self-incrimination was that the court concluded the statements were legislatively compelled and thus involuntary.
The plurality now conclude that these statements are not involuntary, not compelled. It follows that they are not statements obtained in violation of the minor’s privilege against self-incrimination and, if relevant, may be admissible for all purposes. Nonetheless, without offering any other explanation or justification for Ramona R., supra, 37 Cal.3d 802 , that would bring the Ramona R. rule within an exclusion to the rule of article I, section 28, *758 subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, the plurality would reaffirm that rule. I do not join in that aspect of the opinion. Inasmuch as I agree that the minor’s statements to the probation officer are not compelled, I concur in the judgment reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Brown, J., concurred.