Opinion

State v. Michaels

  • 60 Wash. 2d 638
  • 374 P.2d 989
  • 1962 Wash. LEXIS 351
Court
Washington Supreme Court
Filed
Sep 28, 1962
Status
Published
Author
Finley
On the bench
Rosellini, Finley, Ott, Hill, Weaver
Cited by
103 cases
Authority
More cited than 5.2%

Abrogated in part, on other grounds by State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686 (1983)

‘A search of the automobile could reveal nothing useful in establishing the offense for which the defendant was arrested — failure to signal for a left turn — and there was no reason to suspect that he would attempt to flee with the aid of something that might be found in the trunk of his car.’

How later courts described this case

  • ‘A search of the automobile could reveal nothing useful in establishing the offense for which the defendant was arrested — failure to signal for a left turn — and there was no reason to suspect that he would attempt to flee with the aid of something that might be found in the trunk of his car.’
  • reversing conviction for illegal possession of gambling devices, and suppressing evidence obtained in auto search incident to pretextual arrest for failure to give turn signal
  • “An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.” (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S. Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877 (1932); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961))
  • failure to signal for left turn; search produced gambling equipment

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Abrogated in part, on other grounds by State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686 (1983)

    374 P.2d 989, 992 (Wash. 1962) (en banc) (“An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Ringer, 674 P.2d at 1248
    Washington Supreme CourtDec 29, 19832 citing opinionsother groundsin partRead it

The opinion

Finley, C. J.

(concurring in the result) — For the reasons set forth in my concurring opinion in State v. Rousseau (1952), 40 Wn. (2d) 92, 241 P. (2d) 447 , I am opposed to the rule which requires the exclusion or nonuse of evidence or information acquired through illegal arrest or search and seizure. At the time of the Rousseau case, the exclusionary rule was based upon Washington case law originating with State v. Buckley (1927), 145 Wash. 87 , 258 Pac. 1030 . However, the United States Supreme Court has recently stated in Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U. S. 643, 657 , 6 L. Ed. (2d) 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684 , “. . . the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. . . . ” I feel compelled to accede to the ratio decidendi of the Mapp case, and consequently on this basis I concur in the result.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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