defendant, seventeen at time of offense, not entitled to benefit of a subsequently enacted bill which defined the term “child” as any person under the age of eighteen; because language in the enactment did not show it was to be applied retroactively, the law may be applied prospectively only
How later courts described this case
- defendant, seventeen at time of offense, not entitled to benefit of a subsequently enacted bill which defined the term “child” as any person under the age of eighteen; because language in the enactment did not show it was to be applied retroactively, the law may be applied prospectively only
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Dean v. Crisp, 536 P.2d 961 (1975)
” Ironically, the dissent cites Freshour v. Turner, 496 P.2d 389 (Okl.Cr.1972), overruled on other grounds, Dean v. Crisp, 536 P.2d 961 (Okl.Cr.1975), which concerned the application of a statute governing juvenile certification procedures.
The opinion
BUSSEY, Presiding Judge
(specially concurring) :
I concur with the opinion of Judge Simms which sets forth with great clarity the only possible conclusion and application of the statutes of the State of Oklahoma relating to the age of criminal responsibility which can be arrived at without abrogating the doctrine of separation of powers.
When the Circuit Court of Appeals overruled Judge Brett’s opinion in Lamb v. State, Okl.Cr., 475 P.2d 829 , it was unnecessary to revert to the common law, since there existed valid and unrepealed legislation determining the age of criminal responsibility—21 O.S. § 152. The “void” referred to in Schaffer v. Green, supra, related to the uncertainty that existed in the minds of some of the trial judges as to what duly enacted legislative statute controlled. In Schaffer it was suggested that the responsibility for making any change in the existing law rested with the Legislature and they fulfilled their obligation by enacting the provisions of H.B. 1705, which, by its express terms, was not intended to apply retroactively.
Judge Brett’s statement that “I refuse to believe that appellate judges are expected to sit equipped with ‘blinders’ as an obstruction to sight or discernment, as were army mules” brings to mind Matthew Henry’s quotation: “None so blind as those that will not see.”