The opinion
CARTER, J., Dissenting.
I agree with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Schauer, but I wish to call attention to one salient point overlooked by the majority, and that is that notice of the holding of an election is only one element to be considered. There is a time element which is of equal, if not greater, importance than the element of notice. It may be conceded that a substantial and not a strict compliance with the statute provides adequate notice of the election.
But notice merely informs the electorate when and where an election is going to be held. The duration of the period of time between the giving of notice and the date of the elec *739 tion is the important element which permits the full functioning of the democratic process.
There can be no such thing as substantial compliance with the element of duration. The statute required a minimum of 28 days to elapse before the election was held. Only 26 days were permitted to elapse and at oral argument counsel for defendant admitted that under his view of the statute this time could even have been further shortened to 22 days. This must be conceded.
The full duration of the prescribed time represents the Legislature’s decision as to the minimum period required for the completion of the opinion-forming process. It must be conceded that this was a “close” election. * Who can say what number of minds might have been changed one way or the other during the two days which defendant cut off the statutory period by allowing only 26 days after the first publication of the notice.
The voters may have been given notice of the election even though the time had been shortened but they should not be legally deprived of their right to the full statutory period in which to persuade others to their point of view. When the statute prescribed four weeks, it must have been the intention of the framers that those interested in the outcome of the election would have at least 28 days within which to present the pros and eons of the propositions to the voters. The fixing of a shorter period is a violation of both the spirit and letter of the statute.
I would reverse the judgment.
"The vote in the New York Avenue annexation district was 1641 for annexation and 1525 against annexation. The total number of qualified electors of the New York Avenue annexation district was 4430 and the number of electors who voted at said election was 3166, or 71.4% of the total qualified electors.
“The vote in the Honolulu District annexation district was 205 for annexation and 141 against annexation. The total number of qualified electors of the Honolulu Avenue annexation district was 433 and the number of electors who voted at said election was 346, or approximately 80% of the total qualified electors.
“The vote in the Chevy Chase Drive annexation district was 15 for annexation and 11 against annexation. The total number of qualified electors of the Chevy Chase Drive annexation district was 25 and the number of electors who voted at said election was 26, representing 104% of the total qualified electors. (One elector, residing close to but outside the boundaries of said district was erroneously permitted to vote.) ” (Agreed Statement on Appeal.)