“The doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable to statutory construction when it is decided that earlier interpretations are wanting, faulty, or even wrong.” (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- “The doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable to statutory construction when it is decided that earlier interpretations are wanting, faulty, or even wrong.” (citation omitted)
- "We are not authorized to read into it those things which we conceive the legislature may have left out unintentionally. We must assume the legislature meant what it said." (citations omitted)
- decision of the Board shall be deemed prima facie correct and the burden of proving it incorrect is on the party attacking the decision
- DLI's interpretation of the Industrial Insurance Act is not binding on the courts or Legislature
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Rosellini, J.
(concurring)—I have signed Justice Stafford's opinion. However, I desire to point out what appears to me to be persuasive that the respondent was covered under the act.
The 1971 amendment to the industrial insurance act constituted a radical departure in the scope of coverage of industrial insurance. Previously, RCW 51.12.010, as enacted in 1961, was limited to covering only those employments "inherently constantly dangerous" and "such inherently hazardous works and occupations." The 1961 amendment then defined specifically over 70 such occupations. Thus, by design and philosophy, the 1961 act excluded all occupations except those specifically included.
*408 The 1971 amendment completely reversed this method by stating that all occupations were included within the coverage except those few specifically excluded.
This intent was well illustrated by Laws of 1972, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 43, § 6, in the first paragraph:
There is a hazard in all employment and it is the purpose of this title to embrace all employments which are within the legislative jurisdiction of the state.
The exclusions contained in 1971 and 1972 amendments to RCW 51.12.020 were set forth as "the only employments" (italics mine) not within the mandatory coverage and dealt only with domestic service, gardening, casual employment, charitable work in return for aid or sustenance only, agricultural work and "sole proprietors and partners." (Italics mine.)
The legislature in 1971 added a second paragraph to RCW 51.12.010, which reads:
This [act] shall be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries and/or death occurring in the course of employment.
RCW 51.32.030, which gives corporate officers the right to elect to be covered by the act, was impliedly repealed by the amendment in 1971 to RCW 51.12.020. The only employments (which are here pertinent) which shall not be included within the mandatory coverage of this title are "(5) sole proprietors and partners." Nothing is said about excluding an officer of a corporate employer.
In a clear and unambiguous language, the legislature has described the only exemption from the mandatory coverage. Sole proprietors and partners are exempted; corporate officers and members are not.
This to me establishes a commonsense approach to the problem—a single proprietor and partners have it within their power to elect to come under the coverage, while an officer of a corporation, unless he is the majority stockholder, is powerless to elect to come under the coverage. *409 Yet his official duties may be most extrahazardous and dangerous.
Suppose an officer of a corporation is the supervisor for blasting in tunnel work. He must work with and supervise the use of explosives. He is helpless and powerless to obtain the protection of the act. His corporate employer is the only one who can exercise this option.
Suppose an officer is a supervising steel engineer, who must inspect and supervise the use of steel on the 50th floor in a building under construction. Here again, he is engaged in dangerous work without the power to come under the industrial insurance act, and he is powerless to protect his dependents and beneficiaries.
The use of the term "only" in RCW 51.12.020, and the phrase "all employments which are within the legislative jurisdiction of the state" in RCW 51.12.010, does not permit an additional exemption, as the appellants contend.
To me, the intent of the legislature to protect this class of workers or officers of corporations is clear. The language of the act is unambiguous and does not exclude officers of corporations from the mandatory coverage of RCW 51.12.
I would affirm.
Wright, C.J., and Hicks, J., concur with Rosellini, J.