noting general “rule that negligence alone, as a reason to shift the burden of a resulting loss, has not been deemed so grievous as to hold the negligent actor liable beyond the immediate victim’s injury to others who suffer a loss only in consequence of that injury’
How later courts described this case
- noting general “rule that negligence alone, as a reason to shift the burden of a resulting loss, has not been deemed so grievous as to hold the negligent actor liable beyond the immediate victim’s injury to others who suffer a loss only in consequence of that injury’
- noting that the Oregon Supreme Court has “not yet extended liability for ordinary negligence to solely psychic or emotional injury not accompanying any actual or threatened physical harm or any injury to another legally protected interest”
- denying recovery to child for foreseeable damages sustained as a result of mother's bodily injury, in part because general negligence law in Oregon does not recognize the recovery of damages for psychic injuries suffered by one not directly injured by the negligent conduct
- recognizing the “difficulties” with linking recovery to formal relationships “in a society whose practices and common assumptions about * * * relationships are rapidly changing”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*570 TANZER, J.,
concurring.
I concur generally, but add these few words of qualification.
The majority reasons that the anticipated effect of our holding on insurance rates is immaterial to our decision and I agree. I do not wish to be understood, however, as holding that economic realities relevant to assignment of risk are never relevant in making policy judgments as discussed in Ore-Ida Foods v. Indian Head, 290 Or 909 , 627 P2d 469 (1981).
Also, I am hesitant to create judicially an entitlement as unpredictable, formless and limitless as compensation of children for psychic losses due to nonfatal injury to their parents. Unlike the courts, the legislature has the power to create not only new bases for recovery but also appropriate procedures to account for all affected interests. The legislature did so with the current wrongful death statutes, for example. ORS 30.020. Thus, I do not necessarily reject the Iowa approach; rather I recognize that practical limits sometimes render judicial power an unsuitable means for the recognition of new theories of recovery.
Campbell and Carson, JJ., join in this opinion.