explaining that unconstitutional changes proposed by amending an existing article could have been effected through amendment by new article without violating the single-subject requirement
How later courts described this case
- explaining that unconstitutional changes proposed by amending an existing article could have been effected through amendment by new article without violating the single-subject requirement
- construing the single subject and separate-vote provisions of Okla. Const., art. XXIV, § 1 [2d par.] together and interchangeably
- constitutional restrictions on advertising, franchising and retailing alcoholic beverages combined in one amendment constituted "logrolling"
- all invalidated initiative petitions as violative of the one subject rule under State law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*613 OPALA, Justice,
concurring:
The court holds that the initiative measure under review cannot be given clearance for submission to a vote as a proposed constitutional amendment. While I accede to the court’s pronouncement and join in its judgment, I offer (a) some of my own thoughts on the test properly to be used for assaying a measure’s compliance with the single-subject requirement of Art. 24 § 1, Okl.Con., and express (b) my special appeal for a more vigilant judicial protection of a reasonable time span, between clearance and submission of a measure, in order to facilitate full, public and meaningful pre-election ventilation of the propositions to be voted upon.
I.
THE SINGLE-SUBJECT TEST UNDER ART. 24 § 1, OKL.CON.
Viewed liberally — we are urged — each of the petition’s separate propositions deals with but one general subject — the regulation or control of liquor. This subject — we are told — must be recognized as unitary because all of the provisions which relate to it are presently contained in the same article of our fundamental law. Art. 27, Okl. Con. At first blush this argument appears to have merit. On a more profound analysis, it becomes devoid of any semblance of validity and must meet with rejection.
A single-subject measure, within the meaning of Art. 24 § 1, Okl.Con., is one whose componential ingredients, no matter how numerous, are so functionally interrelated as to all form parts of an integrated whole. The widely accepted test for gauging duplicity or multiplicity of subjects is whether the changes proposed are all germane to a singular common subject and purpose or are essentially unrelated one to another. 1
Measured by these criteria of validity, the proposition under consideration cannot pass muster. Its components have no direct, essential relation to each other. None of them is necessary to, or concerned with, any of the others. The individual propositions concatenated in the measure for the proposed constitutional amendment lack a common nexus that imparts internal cohesion and binds them by a singular objective and purpose.
II.
CONSTITUTIONALLY-MANDATED PROTECTION OF A REASONABLE TIME SPAN, BETWEEN JUDICIAL CLEARANCE OF A MEASURE AND ITS SUBMISSION, TO ALLOW FOR MEANINGFUL PRE-ELECTION PUBLIC VENTILATION OF THE ISSUES TO BE VOTED UPON
Another issue implicit in the judicial process that unfolded itself before us has given me pause for concern. This petition’s post-circulation filing was effected August 6th. The protest was timely lodged August 28th. The evidentiary proceedings before the referee could not begin until September 11th. The general election fell on November 4th. Customarily this court has allowed protestants ample time to complete their discovery by a statewide canvass of voters’ registration records and by other investigation necessary for presentation of evidence on the challenge to the validity of signatures. 2 Had as much as a ninety-day discovery period been necessary in this ease, the evidentiary hearings could not have begun until the end of November — too late for submission of the measure at the general election next succeeding the post-circulation filing. Even if the petition had been approved for submission by a final decision made at some point in time between September 11th and November 4th, I seriously doubt that the time span then left between *614 our clearance of the petition and its submission to a vote would have been adequate for a meaningful and informative public debate and discussion. The opportunity for full and public pre-election ventilation of the propositions to be voted upon has come to be regarded not only as a constitutionally-protected interest of the clashing advocacy forces but also as a political value of the public at large in the preservation of a free marketplace interchange of ideas. There can no longer be the slightest doubt about the notion that the advocates’ interest in the debate and the political value of public discussion both stand shielded by the state and federal constitutions. 3
This court has a constitutionally-mandated duty to Uphold and safeguard free pre-election ventilation of political views. Art. 2 § 22, Okl.Con. Judicial clearance of an initiative or referendum measure for submission to a vote must never be allowed to take place so close to the election as to abridge the time span that is required for a full and meaningful public debate and discussion of the propositions to be voted upon.
. Rupe v. Shaw, Okl., 286 P.2d 1094, 1100 [1955]; Kerby v. Luhrs, 44 Ariz. 208 , 36 P.2d 549, 554 [1934], 94 A.L.R. 1502 ; Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423 , 195 P.2d 662, 681 [1948]; Idaho Water Resources Board v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535 , 548 P.2d 35, 52 [1976]; Kahalekai v. Doi, 590 P.2d 543, 552 [Hawaii 1979],
. In re Initiative Petition No. 272, State Question No. 409, Okl., 388 P.2d 290 , 292 [1964].
. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 , 98 S.Ct. 1407 , 55 L.Ed.2d 707 [1978]; Art. 2, § 22, Okl.Con.; Kahalekai v. Doi, supra note 1 at 553.