concluding that mental illness is one of several factors which must be weighed in determining whether a confession is voluntary
How later courts described this case
- concluding that mental illness is one of several factors which must be weighed in determining whether a confession is voluntary
- when psychiatric examination of the defendant yields professional findings that the defendant is competent to stand trial, the question of whether to hold further evidentiary hearings is addressed to discretion of trial court
- explaining legislature’s amendments to M’Naghten rule
- mental illness a factor in determination of voluntar-iness
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Cassell, 1979 Alas. LEXIS 585 (1979)
The Schade case is distinguishable on this point because the defendant there was told that he had a presént right to consult with and be represented by an attorney.
The opinion
BOOCHEVER, Justice
(concurring).
Although I concur with Justice Connor’s view that the Miranda warning given to Schade was adequate under the circumstances of this case, I find it necessary to outline my views.
Even if there were some question as to whether initiation of the interrogation of Schade at the police station rendered it “custodial” so as to necessitate the warning, it is clear that prior to the commencement of questioning Lt. Henderson had focused upon Schade as a suspect, so that Schade must be regarded as in custody for the purpose of requiring a Miranda warning. Nevertheless, Schade had not been placed under arrest and, as far as he knew, could depart at any time. Under these peculiar circumstances I do not believe that the addition to the warning of the statement,
We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court,
so vitiated its effect as to render it invalid.
If, however, such a warning were to be given to one actually under arrest or placed in a position to believe that incarceration was imminent, I would find such language impermissible. Under those circumstances an uninformed accused ignorant of his right to be arraigned promptly might well believe that he must languish in jail for an indefinite period before going to court, so as to have an attorney appointed. Rather than face such a contingency he could well feel coerced into accepting interrogation without counsel.
I find no reasonable possibility that Schade could have been so misled. Since Schade was specifically advised that he had the right to have a lawyer with him during questioning, I agree that the warning as given adequately informed him of his rights. 1
. A similar warning identical in all material respects was upheld in Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1972). But in United States ex rel. *921 Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1972), a divided court found a like warning defective. In both cases the accused had been placed under arrest prior to the questioning.