explaining “[b]ecause the right implicated . . . —access to the courts—is specifically limited by Art. I, § 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, we concluded that it is not a fundamental right”
How later courts described this case
- explaining “[b]ecause the right implicated . . . —access to the courts—is specifically limited by Art. I, § 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, we concluded that it is not a fundamental right”
- Noting that the “important interest in access to the courts . . . should be examined pursuant to an intermediate standard of review.”
- “the legislature has complete control in that it could abolish altogether the right to recover against the Commonwealth in tort actions.”
- Section 18 does not undermine General Assembly’s authority under Section 11 to limit amount of recovery in tort actions against “governmental entities,” or abolish those actions completely
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
While I join in Part I of the majority opinion regarding the constitutional authority to limit tort recovery against the Commonwealth and concur with the result, I once again disagree with the majority’s determination that an intermediate or “heightened scrutiny” standard of review is appropriate. See James v. SEPTA, 505 Pa. 137, 149 , 477 A.2d 1302, 1308 (1984) (Concurring Opinion of Zappala, J.) As in James , I would hold that the proper standard of review is the rational basis test. Under the present facts, this test was met.
HUTCHINSON, J., joins in this concurring opinion.