holding that, if a defendant proves that their attorney failed to act with the minimum level of competence expected of criminal law practitioners, the defendant is entitled to relief if the defendant can additionally demonstrate "a reasonable doubt that the [attorney's] incompetence contributed to the outcome"
How later courts described this case
- holding that, if a defendant proves that their attorney failed to act with the minimum level of competence expected of criminal law practitioners, the defendant is entitled to relief if the defendant can additionally demonstrate "a reasonable doubt that the [attorney's] incompetence contributed to the outcome"
- holding that to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that the attorney’s performance did not conform to the standard of competence of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law and also that the attorney’s incompetence contributed to the conviction
- holding that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases is whether the attorney's conduct fell below the minimal range of competence required of an attorney who has "ordinary training and skill in the criminal law""
- holding that if the applicant established incompetence, “all that is required additionally is to create a reasonable doubt that the incompetence contributed to the outcome”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice,
with whom ERWIN, Justice, joins, concurring.
Although I willingly join in the interment of the “mockery and farce” test, the demise of which was foreshadowed in Mc-Cracken v. State, 1 I wish to note an area of doubt on my part. Under the twofold test adopted today, not only must the defendant show a violation of the Beasley-Moore standard of competency required of counsel but he must also demonstrate that counsel’s lack of skill contributed to his conviction. 2
My concern is that this prejudice requirement is too stringent a standard- once it is shown that the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, under either the Alaska or Federal constitution, was violated. In my opinion, Judge Baze-lon offers a cogent argument for relieving the defendant of the burden of showing prejudice once ineffectiveness has been proven. 3 Pointing to the fact that in regard to other federal criminal constitutional guarantees the government must prove harmless error beyond a- reasonable doubt, Judge Bazelon questions the validity of requiring the defendant to show prejudice after he has demonstrated that his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated. 4
Despite my leanings towards adoption of Judge Bazelon’s choice of placement regarding the burden of proof of prejudice, for now I am willing to wait and observe the operation of our new rule under adversarial testing.
. Opinion No. 1028, 521 P.2d 499 (Alaska 1974).
. Expounding on this latter requirement, we further held that the required proof of prejudice resulting from ineffective assistance of counsel must “create a reasonable doubt that the incompetence contributed to the outcome.”
. D. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 Cincinnati L.Rev. 1 (1973).
. Id. at 29-33. Judge Bazelon perceives the crux of the right to the effective assistance of counsel issue as
. whether counsel did everything that a diligent lawyer could reasonably be expected to do, whether he filled the role imposed on him by the rigors of the adversary system. The articulation of specific duties could help the courts define that role. Id. at 33.