“[W]hether or not the statutory requirements of finality are satisfied in any given case depends not upon the label affixed to its action by the administrative agency, but rather upon a realistic appraisal of the consequences of such action.”
How later courts described this case
- “[W]hether or not the statutory requirements of finality are satisfied in any given case depends not upon the label affixed to its action by the administrative agency, but rather upon a realistic appraisal of the consequences of such action.”
- the reviewing court should review the Board's decision "within the context of the findings of fact and conclusions of the three board members who voted to affirm the City's position."
- on appeal, the court may review an agency's tie vote decision to determine if it was arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous
- a tie vote of the Shorelines Hearings Board results in an affirmance of the decision being reviewed
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Finley, J.
(dissenting) — The Shorelines Hearings Board is a creature of the legislature. Its functions and the manner in which they are to be performed are prescribed by the legislature. More specifically, the legislature, in enacting RCW 90.58.170, provided that the shorelines board would be a quasi-judicial body; that it would consist of six members; and most significantly, that a decision of the board must be agreed to by at least four members to be final. The board reached a stalemate, i.e., a tie (3-to-3) vote in the matter involved in this appeal. This was, I think undebatably, the equivalent of no action or nonaction by the board under the statutory provisions referred to above, requiring an affirmative vote of at least four members of the board to reach a final decision. Why the legislature in establishing the board prescribed such a unique method for the board to reach and effectuate a final decision is not known, certainly not to members of this court. However, they did so. This is obvious and known to the members of this court and anyone else having occasion to read the statute. Perhaps this unique or anomalous situation of a tie vote under statute is worthy of further consideration and possible change by the legislature, but since the legislature in either its wisdom or by inadvertence has constituted the board in this manner, it is not for us to second guess the legislature and change the situation. Presently under the statute as it now exists, I am convinced that as a matter of logic and law there is no action, no final decision, by the shorelines board for the Superior Court or for this court to review. This being the case, I would reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals mandating a review by the Superior Court. This would have the effect of affirmance of the decision of the Superior Court for Thurston County which rea *33 soned and acted in accordance with the reasoning expressed in this dissent.
Stafford and Wright, JJ., concur with Finley, J.
Petition for rehearing denied September 25, 1974.