holding that plaintiffs had not established that they lacked “alternatives to either the condition of being homeless or the conduct that led to homelessness and to the citations”
How later courts described this case
- holding that plaintiffs had not established that they lacked “alternatives to either the condition of being homeless or the conduct that led to homelessness and to the citations”
- finding a municipal ordinance that banned camping in designated pub- lic areas to be facially valid
- applying only a rational basis standard to a similar statute that had “[i]ndi-rect or incidental burdens on travel resulting from otherwise lawful governmental action”
- "To support a determination of facial unconstitutionality, voiding [a] statute as a whole, petitioners cannot prevail by suggesting that in some future hypothetical situation constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the partied-lar application of the statute ...." (emphasis in original)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KENNARD, J., Concurring.
I join in the majority opinion. I write separately to clarify a point.
The concurring opinion of Justice Werdegar states that the majority “evidently reject[s] on its merits, the claim that a homeless person may not constitutionally be punished for publicly engaging in harmless activities necessary to life, such as sleeping.” (Cone. opn. of Werdegar, J., post, at p. 1111.) Because that issue is not properly before us in this facial challenge to the ordinance, the majority does not address it, and it expressly says so: “[Tjhe Court of Appeal did not distinguish between involuntarily being homeless, and involuntarily engaging in conduct that violated the ordinance. The court assumed that an involuntarily homeless person who involuntarily camps on public property may be convicted or punished under the ordinance. That question, which the Court of Appeal and the dissent address, and which might be raised in an ‘as applied’ challenge to the ordinance, is not before us because plaintiffs offered no evidence that the ordinance was being applied in that manner. We express no opinion on the proper construction of the ordinance, in particular on whether the conduct it prohibits must be ‘willful,’ or on whether or in what circumstances a necessity defense is available.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1104, fn. 19.)
Thus, the majority does not decide whether a person who by reason of necessity falls asleep in a public park may constitutionally be successfully prosecuted. Moreover, the majority does not address, much less reject on its merits, a claim that there are no constitutional limits on punishing conduct regardless of the circumstances. Nor does it determine whether or not homelessness is a “status” as that term is described in Robinson v. California (1962) 370 U.S. 660 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 758 , 82 S.Ct. 1417 ], and in Powell v. Texas (1968) 392 U.S. 514 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 ]. What the majority does decide is the issue before it: that the challenged camping ordinance does not on its face constitute prohibited punishment based on status. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1104-1106.)