Quincy City Hospital v. Labor Relations Commission

Liacos, J.

(concurring). I agree with the result the court reaches in this case. I do not believe, however, that the Labor Relations Commission’s dismissal of the hospital’s complaint constitutes a “final order” for purposes of G. L. c. 150E (1984 ed.). Nor do I believe that the principal cases the court cites lend support to its conclusion. Accordingly, I write briefly to clarify my understanding of our holdings in Lyons v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 397 Mass. 498 (1986), and Boston Hous. Auth. v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 398 Mass. 715 (1986).

In Lyons v. Labor Relations Comm’n, supra at 501-502, our overriding concern was to protect the constitutional rights of dissenting employees who objected to a union’s “spending of a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative.” Lyons v. Labor Relations Comm’n, supra at 501, quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of *751 Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977). Our focus was not what level of commission decision was involved. Rather, we were considering the finality and appealability of “any decision by the commission . . . which effectively determines the outcome of a constitutionally based challenge of an agency fee” (emphasis supplied). Lyons, supra at 502 . Prehearing dismissals with such effect will be construed as final orders under G. L. c. 150E, § 11, subject to judicial review pursuant to the provisions of G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1984 ed.). In my view, prehearing dismissals without such effect should not be so construed. For it was our concern that “the courts remain available as the ultimate protectors of constitutional rights,” Lyons, id., quoting Chicago Teachers Union Local 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 , 307 n.20 (1986), and not the type of agency decision involved, which animated our analysis in Lyons .

Nor does our reasoning in Boston Hous. Auth. v. Labor Relations Comm’n, supra, support the court’s broad conclusion that “a prehearing dismissal is a ‘final order’ under G. L. c. 150E.” The court quotes from that case as follows: “There is no doubt that the commission’s decision . . . was in a sense ‘final’ as it dismissed the petition.” Ante at 747. That statement, however, is clearly limited by the next two sentences. “Moreover, the dismissal was based upon the commission’s view that it lacked jurisdiction to proceed .... Because the commission’s action was predicated on its view that it lacked jurisdiction, it is not necessary to reach the question whether every dismissal of a petition to investigate... is . . . appealable under § 11.” Boston Hous. Auth. v. Labor Relations Comm’n, supra at 717. Thus, the jurisdictional ground for the commission’s dismissal was the key to our conclusion regarding its status as a “final order.”

To my mind, cases where First Amendment rights are clearly implicated, as in Lyons, supra, and where the agency decides erroneously that its jurisdiction does not extend to a particular matter, as in Boston Hous. Auth. v. Labor Relations Comm’n, supra, differ significantly from the case at hand. The hospital cites to us no case extending the status of “final order” to prehearing dismissals of the commission in areas other than *752 these. It seems a sweeping, and unwarranted, stretch of our prior cases for this court to decide this claim that the union violated G. L. c. 150E, because it was involved in the refusal of some maintenance employees to wear the jackets. Nothing in the issues raised by this case warrants the extraordinary sweep of the court’s holding.

Moreover, the inappropriateness of this court’s review of lack of probable cause determinations of administrative agencies is demonstrated by the parties’ dispute over the “facts” in the present case. Basically, there is no factual record before us. The union recites what it characterizes as facts; the hospital claims they are nothing but unsubstantiated conclusions and allegations. The attention of this court is not wisely focused on disputes at such a stage.

Finally, the union states that the subject of the hospital’s charge is covered in their collective bargaining agreement and that the “dispute is [the] subject of a grievance in process through the grievance and arbitration procedure.” The hospital does not appear to disagree. In my view, the far wiser course for this court would be to let the arbitration process run its course and not to involve ourselves in disputes of this nature. I would dismiss the appeal and let stand the decision of the Labor Relations Commission.