explaining that court-adopted procedure identical to § 29-1929 was intended “to ensure complete disclosure so that counsel will be prepared to cross-examine an informant-witness”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that court-adopted procedure identical to § 29-1929 was intended “to ensure complete disclosure so that counsel will be prepared to cross-examine an informant-witness”
- requiring extensive pretrial disclosure and pretrial hearing on reliability and also permitting instruction that emphasized the need for exceptional care in evaluating jailhouse informant testimony
- adopting special procedures in relation to use of jailhouse informant testimony, including discovery and special jury instruction
- declining to require hearing as intrusive on jury’s function
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STRUBHAR, P.J.:
specially concurring.
¶ 1 I concur in the Court’s decision to reverse and remand this case to the district court for a new trial based on the error stemming from the defense’s inability to impeach the jailhouse informant in this case. I further agree and applaud the majority’s decision to adopt notice requirements and to mandate the administration of the amended version of Instruction No. ÍM3 OUJI-CR(2d) when the prosecution uses a jailhouse informant as part of its case.
¶ 2 This ease illustrates the problems associated with the use of jailhouse informants who often play a pivotal role in an accused’s conviction. While I recognize the need to use jailhouse informants’ testimony, we must take certain precautions to ensure a citizen is not convicted on the testimony of an unreliable professional jailhouse informant, or snitch, who routinely trades dubious information for favors. The use of such untrustworthy witnesses carries considerable costs, especially in death-penalty cases, by undermining the foundation of cases where the stakes are the highest. The misuse of such informants also adds financial costs to taxpayers when convictions based on their testimony are reversed to be retried. Therefore, to ensure the utmost reliability in the admission of jailhouse informant testimony, I would also mandate the reliability hearing prescribed in the original opinion in this matter. Dodd v. State, 1999 OK CR 29 , rehearing granted vacating and withdrawing opinion, 70 OBJ 2952 (Oct. 6, 1999). As with the use of Daubert 1 hearings to ensure the relevance and reliability of novel scientific expert testimony, this reliability hearing will allow the trial court to perform its gate-keeping function and filter out prejudicial jailhouse informant testimony that is more probably false than true. I am authorized to state that Judge Johnson joins in this writing.
. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 , 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2798 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). See also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1171 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (concluding that Daubert's general holding setting forth the trial judge’s general "gatekeeping” obligation applies not only to testimony based on "scientific” knowledge, but also to testimony based on "technical” and "other specialized” knowledge.)